時尚雙語:環保:不只去做一些無關緊要的事

Robert Samuelson has an article at Real Clear Politics this morning that hones in on the likely results of a “cap and trade” regime in the United States:

The chief political virtue of cap-and-trade — a complex scheme to reduce greenhouse gases — is its complexity. This allows its environmental supporters to shape public perceptions in essentially deceptive ways. Cap-and-trade would act as a tax, but it’s not described as a tax. It would regulate economic activity, but it’s promoted as a “free market” mechanism. Finally, it would trigger a tidal wave of influence-peddling, as lobbyists scrambled to exploit the system for different industries and localities. This would undermine whatever the system’s abstract advantages.

That been the experience with the EU’s system:

Fights have erupted as countries seek to guard their interests. Eastern European nations have lobbied for more generous allocations because of their communist legacies and lower living standards. Germany, the continent’s largest wind-energy producer, wants an E.U. mandate that each country get 20 percent of its energy from renewable resources by 2020; Poland, which uses no renewable resources, is resisting.

Germany boasts that it has cut emissions to 18.4 percent below 1990 levels, the benchmark used in the Kyoto Protocol and in Europe. But nearly half the reduction was because of sagging industrial output in the former East Germany after reunification. For the 2008-2012 period, E.U. officials sliced 5 percent off Germany’s emissions proposal.

Individual companies have also haggled over whether their historical records were representative emission benchmarks.

“A paper mill in Italy would get different credits from a paper mill in Germany, even if they are completely the same,” said Marco Mensink, energy and environment director of the Confederation of European Paper Industries.

Perversely, Europe’s cap-and-trade system has done little to reduce output at such places as the Janschwalde coal plant, Europe’s third-biggest carbon dioxide emitter. Each year, it spews more than 25 million tons of carbon dioxide. The dirty gray plant still has turbines and generators that date from Soviet times. It has nine cooling towers, and just half of its output can power all of Berlin.

There have been improvements in carbon emissions in Europe (the improvements here without such a system have been greater) but I’ve seen no attempts at disaggregating the effects of cap and trade and other EU policies aimed in that direction from the export of EU manufacturing to China which I believe is the primary cause of reductions in emissions and energy use both in the EU and here.

I have no objection to moves to reduce carbon emissions in principle, particularly moves that would reward greater efficiency. My own preferred policy would be a straightforward carbon tax. Less riggable. But I also think that we’re likely to get more bang for the buck by removing the vast array of government incentives that encourage greater energy consumption generally and greater oil consumption in particular. I have no illusions that such a plan would ever be adopted. Too many of our oxen would be gored.

If the next administration is a Democratic one I expect we’ll see greater moves in the direction of a cap and trade system. Its very complexity tends to be attractive to technocrats. However, with the political constraints that our legislators are feeling these days I think we’ll see even more out-and-out regulation without much in the way of measures to increase enforcement of the regulations. That has the benefit of appearing to be doing something about the problem without incurring the costs of actually doing something about it. Talk as always is cheap.

If the next administration is a Republican one I doubt that much substantive will be done, especially considering today’s Republican Party’s allergy to taxes. We’ll continue to make most of the same mistakes we’re making now.

今天上午，羅伯特薩繆爾森在"Real Clear Politics"上發表的一篇文章，極大的完善了美國的“排放貿易”制度：

這是“排放貿易”制度最主要的政治優點-一個複雜的計劃用以減少溫室氣體-它的複雜性.這使得其環保的支持者，基本上是在以欺騙的方式形成市民的看法.排放貿易將作爲稅，但它不被形容爲稅。它將規範經濟活動，但同時它作爲一個“自由市場”的機制被推廣。 最後，它會引起海嘯式的影響-說客爭相利用該系統對不同行業和地區的規定進行推銷。這將破壞該系統的理論優勢。

這一直是歐盟制度的經驗：

因爲國家尋求防範他們的利益而導致打鬥爆發。而東歐國家遊說是爲了更慷慨的分配，因爲他們的共產主義遺留思想和較低的生活水平。

德國，歐洲大陸最大的風力能源的生產者，希望歐盟的任務是到2020年，每個國家能獲得20 ％的來自可再生資源的能源，波蘭，它卻抵制這種做法，沒有使用可再生資源。德國自誇它已削減排放量的18.4 ％，低於用於京都協議書和歐洲的1990年的基準水平，

但實質上德國有將近一半的減少是因爲在前東德統一後工業產值低靡。， 歐盟官員提出關於在2008-2012年間削減德國5 ％排放量的建議。

個體公司也爭論代表的廢氣排放基準是否超過了他們的歷史紀錄，

“造紙廠在意大利和造紙廠在德國會得到不同的貸款，即使他們是完全一樣的”，歐洲造紙工業的邦聯能源和環境署署長馬曼思克說。

相反的，歐洲的排放貿易體制在像減少janschwalde煤電廠的排出方面做的很少，它是歐洲的第三大二氧化碳排放源。每年，它噴出超過25萬噸的二氧化碳，骯髒的灰色車間仍然有蘇聯時代的渦輪機和發電機，它有9個冷卻塔，只需一半的輸出產量可以相當於柏林所有的二氧化碳噴出量。

碳排放量在歐洲已有所改善（在缺少這樣一個系統的情況下改善是非常重要的），但我見到它對分解排放貿易的影響沒有作用，其他歐盟政策的目的是在這一方向上出口歐盟製造業到中國，我相信這是排放量減少和能源在歐盟和在這裏的使用的首要原因。

在原則上，我對減少二氧化碳排放量的行爲並無異議，尤其是獎勵提高工作效率的行爲。我自己偏好的政策就是採取一個簡單的碳稅。少非法操縱. 但我也認爲我們很可能獲得更多的重擊通過推卸責任，撤消大量的政府獎勵措施，鼓勵更多的能源消耗和更大的石油消費量，特別是，我幻想着認爲這樣的一個計劃，在任何時候都將獲得通過。太多，我們會有衝突。

如果下一屆政府是一個民主的政府，我期望我們將能看到在排放貿易體制方面有更大的舉動。其非常複雜，往往吸引着科技工作者。然而，隨着政治上的限制，這些天來，我們的立法者，我認爲他們都感到了我們將看到更地地道道的規例，在沒有多大措施的途徑上，以增加有關規例的執行。實際上，在沒有對成本做一些事情時，似乎對這個問題做一些事是有好處的，不過如果是談的話當然是很容易的。

如果下一屆政府是一個共和黨政府，我猜想會有很多實質性工作要做，尤其是考慮到現在的共和黨對稅的過敏性。我們將繼續犯現在我們正在犯的同樣錯誤中的大部分錯誤。

見前面

我猜想，從專業的政治家的角度來看，最後這一點可能是排放貿易計劃的最大好處，尤其對於開發工程管理系統。畢竟，石油和煤炭現在比開發工程管理系統更有可能送錢給共和黨. 在最初幾年後，這可能會改變，更不用說這將創造所有其他影響推銷的可能性。並請注意，我不是特地指那些代表（尤其不是目前的民選官員）以上的機電工程署署長。他們由不同的遊說買和支付。如果排放貿易成爲現實，他們會適應這種制度。

它是一項功能，而非缺陷。

目前，美國對散佈污染物質者有排放貿易體制，我不認爲他們已經有上文所述的最壞的情況下的影響的任何一點。該系統的自由市場者倡導以單純的指揮和控制條例作爲首選， （您將只能排放z微米的K物質或證明給我們您用以減少K物質的排放量所使用的最好的技術）。

我想申明兩點：

市場的創造不是成本全免的。在伊利諾斯州，我相信政府的成本是通過那些排放者的申請費來實現的。有些人可能稱之爲稅。

第二，複雜的附帶成本。最近，在伊利諾斯州我已經表示，政府給予一個新的清潔空氣法案許可證的過程將需時3至5年，。並非所有都歸咎於排放量貿易（或許只有一點點可以），但它不斷惡化，任務也隨之不斷增加。