如何避免中國經濟結構性改革的風險

For some, China represents a positive scenario of structural reforms returning the country to its position as the engine of world growth. Not only do we think this is unlikely, we actually believe China poses a systemic risk of historic proportions.

對於一些人而言，中國代表着一個結構性改革讓國家重返世界增長引擎地位的積極案例。我們不僅認爲這是不太可能的，還認爲中國構成一個規模罕見的系統性風險。

It is now clear that China is not smoothly passing its growth baton from exports and investment to the service sector. Official GDP data still show growth, but this has decelerated significantly despite numerous interest rate cuts and massive fiscal support.

現在很明顯，中國沒有平穩將其增長接力棒從出口和投資轉交給服務業。官方國內生產總值(GDP)數據仍顯示增長，但增速已大幅放緩，儘管利率多次下調而且推出了大規模財政支持。

Debt is key

債務是關鍵

The reason for such weakness is debt. It is hard to exaggerate the magnitude of the Chinese debt bubble. According to the Band for International Settlements, debt to GDP has increased by around 100 per cent since 2008, which compares with about 40 per cent in the US leading up to the subprime meltdown, 60 per cent in Japan prior to its collapse in 1997 and is even more than the credit booms of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy in the run up to the euro crisis. The only similar credit bubble in recent history was that in Thailand before the Asia crisis. And if an economy the size of China’s goes through what Thailand went through in 1997, the world will be a very ugly place indeed.

這種疲弱的原因是債務。要誇大中國債務泡沫的規模是很難的。根據國際清算銀行(BIS)的數據，自2008年以來，債務與GDP之比已上升約100%，高於次貸危機之前美國的大約40%，1997年泡沫破裂之前日本的60%，甚至超過歐元危機之前的希臘、葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利的信貸熱潮。在近期歷史上，唯一與此類似的信貸泡沫發生在亞洲金融危機之前的泰國。如果像中國這種規模的經濟體遭遇1997年泰國經歷的危機，那麼世界確實將變得非常難看。

Chinese debt is concentrated in the corporate sector, but this distinction is blurred given the use of state owned enterprises and local authority lending vehicles by the Chinese government during the investment binge. According to Autonomous Research estimates, corporate sector debt will rise to above eight times income in 2016, double its level in 2008. There are many zombie companies that simply have to borrow just to service their current debts. Gavekal Dragonomics estimates that 28 per cent of Shanghai Composite companies are loss-making when subsidies are stripped out. And debt is still growing rapidly, with credit growth running at twice the rate of nominal GDP expansion.

中國的債務集中在企業領域，但鑑於中國政府在投資熱潮期間利用國有企業和地方政府融資工具，這種界限有點模糊。根據Autonomous Research的估計，2016年企業債務將升至利潤的8倍以上，是2008年水平的兩倍。很多殭屍企業不得不借款償還當前債務。龍洲經訊(Gavekal Dragonomics)估計，若剔除補貼，28%的上證綜指成分股公司將出現虧損。而且債務仍在迅速增長，信貸增速是名義GDP擴張速度的兩倍。

One positive aspect is that the vast majority of debt is funded domestically, so China’s external vulnerability is nothing like Thailand’s in 1997. However, this still means Chinese savers are on the hook. As with all debt bubbles, there has been a great deal of financial engineering to hide the debt and who guarantees it. In China, banks have created vast off-balance sheet structures named Wealth Management Products (WMP) that are stuffed full of bank loans, funded by short-maturity deposits. The US and Europe had their own off-balance sheet vehicles in 2008 – SIVs and conduits – which subsequently blew up when the mortgage debt bubble collapsed. Autonomous Research estimates that by the end of this year Chinese WMPs will be more than double the size of the $1.7tn SIV/conduit market in 2008.

一項利好是，大多數債務是在國內融資的，因此中國的外部脆弱性完全不像1997年的泰國。然而，這仍意味着中國儲戶承擔着風險。就像所有債務泡沫那樣，中國出現了大量金融工程來隱藏債務和債務擔保人。在中國，銀行創建了大量被稱爲理財產品(WMP)的表外結構，裏面充斥着銀行貸款，由短期存款融資。美國和歐洲在2008年也有他們的表外工具：結構性投資工具(SIV)和管道(conduits)，在抵押貸款泡沫破裂後，這些工具隨即解體。Autonomous Research估計，到今年底，中國理財產品的規模將達到2008年1.7萬億美元結構性投資工具/管道市場的兩倍多。

Even more worrying has been the rise of peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, which has all the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme. In January, authorities closed down P2P lender Ezubao, with 900,000 investors facing losses of $7.6bn between them. Total P2P loans quadrupled in 2015 to around $150bn and the Chinese regulator thinks that about a third of P2P lenders are problematic.

甚至更令人擔心的是個人對個人貸款(P2P)，這種操作具有龐氏騙局(Ponzi scheme)的全部特徵。今年1月，中國當局關閉了P2P貸款機構e租寶，其90萬名投資者面臨總計76億美元的損失。2015年，中國的P2P貸款規模增長3倍，至1500億美元左右，中國監管機構認爲，約三分之一的P2P貸款機構是有問題的。

Estimating the amount of debt that needs to be written off by China is not an exact science. It boils down to how much excess capacity has been built with little chance of making an economic return. Julien Garran at MacroStrategy estimates there has been around $8tn of excess fixed capital formation in China since 2008, which, assuming that 60 per cent turn into non-performing loans and a 40 per cent recovery rate, suggests losses of $3tn. This is about 30 per cent of Chinese GDP. Autonomous Research gets to a similarly large number by looking at losses realised by other countries following their own credit bubbles. This far outstrips the loss-absorbing capacity of the financial system, and would therefore require significant state support to resolve.

估算中國需要減記的債務規模不是一門精確科學。這要歸結於打造了多少基本上無望帶來經濟回報的過剩產能。MacroStrategy的朱利恩•加蘭(Julien Garran)估計，自2008年以來，中國形成了約8萬億美元的過剩固定投資，假設有60%變成不良貸款，而壞賬回收比例爲40%，那麼這意味着3萬億美元的虧損。這相當於中國GDP的30%左右。在對其他國家在信貸泡沫破裂後承認的虧損進行評估後，Autonomous Research得出了相似的巨大數字。這遠遠超出了金融體系吸收虧損的能力，因此需要重大的政府支持來解決。

Potential for crisis

爆發危機的可能性

The key to a crisis is domestic confidence. Chinese policymakers are trying very hard to avoid the worst. Instead, they are attempting to take the Japanese route of delaying the final judgement day. However, this is a double-edged sword. Volatility remains subdued for now, but the future crisis is getting larger.

危機的關鍵是國內信心。中國政策制定者正非常努力地避免最壞情況發生。他們正試圖採用日本的路線：推遲最後清算日的到來。然而，這是一把雙刃劍。目前波動性仍然不大，但未來危機的規模正變大。

This year has already witnessed a number of Chinese policies that help paper over the cracks. The housing market has been in focus, with purchase restrictions being lifted leading to a rapid increase in house prices across a handful of major cities. However, there is still a huge nationwide housing inventory backlog that needs to be worked through. It now seems as though restrictions are being tightened once again to try to avoid this localised housing bubble.

今年，中國已出臺很多政策幫助掩蓋困境。房地產市場近來受到關注，解除購房限制促使中國幾個大城市的房價迅速上漲。然而，中國仍需要消化全國性的大量住宅庫存問題。如今，爲了避免局部出現房地產泡沫，購房限制似乎正再次收緊。

There have also been headlines of fiscal loosening, with Beijing lifting the official central budget deficit to 3 per cent of GDP for 2016. However, the true government deficit is already around 10 per cent, if we include local authority budgets, funded via a surging government bond market. It will be difficult to accelerate this already breakneck speed.

此外，財政寬鬆也成了新聞頭條，中國政府將今年官方中央財政赤字佔GDP的比例上調至3%。然而，如果我們納入通過日益高漲的政府債券市場融資的地方政府預算的話，政府赤字的真實規模已在10%左右。很難加快這一已經驚人的速度。

Not recognising non-performing loans is also part of a broader policy of ‘extend and pretend’. However, not crystallising losses does not make their impact go away. Even if the Chinese debt mountain does not collapse overnight, it will continue to weigh on domestic economic activity and inflation.

不承認不良貸款也是更爲廣泛的“延期並假裝”(extend and pretend)政策的一部分。然而，不明確虧損並不會消除它們的影響。即便中國的鉅額債務不會在一夜之間坍塌，它仍會繼續拖累國內經濟活動和通脹。

This Japanese extend and pretend policy does not solve the structural problems in China, it simply delays and worsens the final resolution.

這種日本式的“延期並假裝”政策不會解決中國的結構性問題，它只會推遲最終的清算，並使其變得更糟。