低通脹頑疾困擾世界 A world stumped by stubbornly low inflation

Here is a thought experiment that illuminates the challenges currently facing macroeconomic policymakers in the US and the rest of the industrial world.

以下是一個闡釋美國及其他工業化國家的宏觀經濟政策制定者目前所面臨挑戰的思維實驗。

Imagine that in a brief period inflation expectations around the industrial world, as inferred from both the markets for indexed bonds or inflation swaps, rose by nearly 50 basis points to a level well above the 2 per cent target with larger increases foreseen at longer horizons.

試想在一段短暫的時期裏，從指數掛鉤債券市場或通脹掉期市場來推斷，工業化國家的通脹預期上升了近50個基點，達到遠高於2%目標的水平，同時從較長時期來看預計還會有更大幅度的上升。

Imagine that at the same time survey measures of inflation expectations, such as those calculated by the University of Michigan and New York Federal Reserve in the US, were rising sharply.

試想一下，在同一時間裏，通脹預期的調查數據，比如由美國密歇根大學(University of Michigan)和紐約聯邦儲備銀行(New York Fed)得出的結果，也在迅速上升。

Imagine also that commodity prices were soaring and that the dollar experienced a decline seen once every 15 years.

試想大宗商品價格也在飆漲，而美元經歷了15年一遇的貶值。

Imagine that the market estimate of future monetary policy in the US was far tighter than the Federal Reserve’s own policy projections.

試想市場所預估的美國未來貨幣政策比美聯儲(Fed)本身的政策預期要緊得多。

Imagine that measures of gross domestic product growth were accelerating with increasing signs of a worldwide boom.

試想國內生產總值(GDP)增長數據正在加速上升，同時有越來越多的跡象指向了全球範圍內的繁榮。

Imagine too that no serious efforts were under way to reduce deficits.

試想不會有什麼嚴肅的舉措即將出臺以減低赤字。

Finally, suppose that officials were comfortable with current policy settings based on the argument that Phillips curve models predicted that inflation would revert over time to target due to the supposed relationship between unemployment and price increases.

最後，假設官員們基於菲利普斯曲線(Phillips curve)模型的主張，對當前的政策環境感到滿意。該模型預測，由於失業率和價格上漲之間應有的關係，通脹將隨着時間推移趨向目標值。

I think it is fair to assert that in this hypothetical circumstance there would be pervasive concern that policy was behind the curve. There would be fears that much was at risk as inflation expectations were becoming unanchored and that a substantial set of policy adjustments were appropriate.

我認爲可以合理地斷言，人們會在這種假設的情況下普遍擔憂政策落後於形勢。人們會擔心，隨着通脹預期變得失去控制，很多事物都處於危險之中，進行一系列重大政策調整恐怕是適當的。

The key point is that allowing not just a temporary increase in inflation but a shift to abovetarget inflation expectations could be very costly.

關鍵問題在於，如果不僅放任通脹暫時上升，還任由通脹預期轉向高於目標的水平，代價可能非常高昂。

At present we are living in a world that is the mirror image of the hypothetical one just described. Market measures of inflation expectations have been collapsing and on the Fed’s preferred inflation measure are now in the range of 1-1.25 per cent over the next decade.

目前我們生活在與剛剛描述的假想完全相反的世界。通脹預期的市場衡量指標一直在下滑，美聯儲偏好的通脹衡量指標目前所處的範圍是，未來10年通脹率爲1%到1.25%。

Inflation expectations are even lower in Europe and Japan. Survey measures have shown sharp declines in recent months. Commodity prices are at multi-decade lows and the dollar has only risen as rapidly as in the past 18 months twice during the past 40 years when it has fluctuated widely.

歐洲和日本的通脹預期更低。調查數據表明近來數月出現了大幅下滑。大宗商品價格處於數十年來的低點。美元在過去18個月內的升值速度在其幣值大幅起伏的過去40年裏只出現過兩次。

The Fed’s most recent forecasts call for interest rates to rise almost 2 per cent in the next two years, while the market foresees an increase of only about 0.5 per cent.

美聯儲的最新預測主張利率會在接下來2年內上升近2%，而市場預測利率僅會上升約0.5%。

Consensus forecasts are for US growth of only about 1.5 per cent for the six months from last October to March. And the Fed is forecasting a return to its 2 per cent inflation target on the basis of models that are not convincing to most outside observers.

對美國從去年10月到今年3月這6個月期間的增長率，共識預測僅爲約1.5%。美聯儲還基於無法讓大多數外部觀察者信服的模型預測通脹會迴歸2%的目標。

Despite the apparent symmetry, the current mood is nothing like the one posited in my hypothetical example.

即使現在的情況和我設想的情形明顯存在對稱性，兩種情況下的市場情緒也完全不相像。

While there is certainly substantial anxiety about the macroeconomic environment, as judged from the meeting of the Group of 20 big economies in Shanghai last week, there is no evidence that policymakers are acting strongly to restore their credibility as inflation expectations fall below target.

儘管從近期二十個大型經濟體在上海舉行的二十國集團(G20)會議來看，現在顯然存在對宏觀經濟環境的嚴重焦慮情緒，但沒有證據表明政策制定者在採取有力行動，在通脹預期下滑至目標水平以下之際重建他們的信譽。

In a world that is one major adverse shock away from a global recession, little if anything directed at spurring demand was agreed. Central bankers communicated a sense that there was relatively little left that they can do to strengthen growth or even to raise inflation. This message was reinforced by the highly negative market reaction to Japan’s move to negative interest rates. No significant announcements regarding non-monetary measures to stimulate growth or a return to target inflation were forthcoming, either.

在這個只要再發生一次重大負面衝擊就會進入全球衰退的世界，各方爲刺激需求而達成的一致即使存在，也是很少的。央行官員們傳遞出一種感覺，即在提振增長、或者哪怕只是提高通脹方面，他們能做的相對而言已經所剩無幾。市場對日本負利率舉措的極爲消極的反應加強了這一訊息。也沒有誰宣佈有什麼提振增長或者回歸通脹目標的非貨幣政策的重大舉措即將出臺。

Perhaps this should not be surprising. In the 1970s it took years for policymakers to recognise how far behind the curve they were on inflation and to make strong policy adjustments.

或許這不應讓人感到驚訝。上世紀70年代，政策制定者花了數年時間才認識到他們在通脹方面落後形勢有多遠，進而採取強有力的政策調整。

Policymakers continued to worry about a supposed lack of demand long after it was an important problem. The first attempts to contain inflation were too timid to be effective and success was achieved only with highly determined policy. A crucial step was the abandonment of the idea that the problem was structural in nature rather than driven by macroeconomic policy.

在所謂的需求不足成爲一個重大問題很久以後，政策制定者仍舊擔心這個問題。當年遏制通脹的最初嘗試過於小心翼翼，無法起到效果，只是後來通過非常堅決的政策才取得了成功。關鍵的一步是放棄認爲問題本質上是結構性的，而非由宏觀經濟政策造成。

Today’s risks of embedded low inflation tilting towards deflation and of secular stagnation in output growth are at least as serious as the inflation problem of the 1970s. They too will require shifts in policy paradigms if they are to be resolved.

如今，根深蒂固的低通脹正演變爲通縮的風險，以及產出增長長期停滯的風險，至少和上世紀70年代的通脹問題一樣嚴重。如果想要應對這些風險，現在也需要轉變政策範式。

In all likelihood the important elements will be a combination of fiscal expansion drawing on the opportunity created by super low rates and, in extremis, further experimentation with unconventional monetary policies.

重要的政策要素很有可能將是以下二者的結合：利用超低利率所創造的機會進行財政擴張，和在極端情況下進行進一步非常規貨幣政策實驗。