壓力測試無法解決歐元區危機
Will the asset quality review and stress tests conducted by the European Central Bank and the European Banking Authority mark a turning point in the eurozone’s crisis? Up to a point. They are an improvement on what has gone before. But they are not a complete fix for the banking sector, still less for the economy’s wider problems.
GD EXCISEDThe optimistic assessment is that the ECB has at least done enough to mend the banking system. There are two things to be said for this judgment: first, the ECB has taken a close look at the quality of assets in the system; and, second, the “stresses” imposed in the tests are tough. They seem comparable to those imposed by the Federal Reserve on US banks. The ECB concluded that 25 institutions, nine of them Italian, would need to add a total of 25bn in capital. This number has already fallen to 13bn because of capital-raising undertaken this year.
Perhaps the most important possibility omitted by this assessment is that of sovereign default. This bears on a fundamental concern: risk-weighted capital requirements, on which the analysis is based, involve making judgments about the safety of different types of assets. This is especially problematic in the eurozone, where the lack of a unified fiscal backstop for banks means that national governments are responsible for rescuing troubled institutions. Moreover, the solvency of the eurozone’s highly indebted members is more doubtful than that of countries with their own currencies. Since a banking crisis would be even harder to deal with in the eurozone than elsewhere, it would be wise for its banks to have bigger capital buffers that stand a better chance of preventing one. This is particularly important when actual leverage is so much higher than the risk-weighted capital ratios suggest. (See chart.)
Fortunately, banks with the smallest amount of equity relative to actual assets are located in relatively solvent countries, such as the Netherlands, France and Germany. Nonetheless, leverage is 20 to 1 in Spain and Italy; 25 to 1 in Germany and France; and 30 to 1 in the Netherlands. It is questionable whether this is enough loss-absorbing capital.
High leverage also impairs the ability of banks to finance growth. A responsibly managed yet highly leveraged institution would seek to make heavily collateralised loans, against property, for example; or to hold highly rated assets. This is likely to militate against the productive investment the eurozone needs.
歐洲央行(ECB)和歐洲銀行業管理局(EBA)進行的資產質量評估(Asset Quality Review)和壓力測試是否標誌着歐元區危機的轉折點？在某種程度上的確如此。它們是對過去發生的事情的改進。但它們並不能完全修正銀行業，更不可能完全解決歐元區經濟存在的更大的問題。
樂觀的評價是，歐洲央行至少爲修正銀行體系做出了足夠的努力。這個論斷有兩點值得強調：首先，歐洲央行仔細審查了銀行體系中的資產質量；其次，測試施加的“壓力”是強大的，似乎可以與美聯儲(Fed)在對美國銀行進行壓力測試時施加的壓力條件相提並論。歐洲央行的結論是，25家銀行（其中9家是意大利銀行）需要填補總額爲250億歐元的資本缺口。由於相關銀行今年進行了籌資，目前資本缺口數額已降至130億歐元。
或許這個評價遺漏了一個最重要的可能性：主權債務違約。主權債務違約與一個令人憂慮的根本性問題相關，也就是風險加權資本要求，它涉及對不同類型資產的安全性做出判斷，而分析也正是建立在此要求之上。在這方面，歐元區的問題尤其嚴重，由於銀行業缺乏統一的財政保障體系，陷入困境的銀行要由各個成員國的政府來紓困。而且，歐元區中債臺高築的成員國的償付能力，比保留本國貨幣的國家更值得懷疑。既然在歐元區應對銀行業危機比在任何其他地方都困難，歐元區銀行應持有更充足的緩衝資本，從而提高防止危機發生的機率，這纔是明智之舉。而實際槓桿水平比風險加權資本比率體現的槓桿水平高得多（如圖），使這一點變得格外重要。
幸運的是，股本與實際資產之比最低的銀行都在相對有償付能力的國家，比如荷蘭、法國和德國。然而，西班牙和意大利的槓桿倍數是20倍，德國和法國是25倍，荷蘭是30倍。它們是否擁有足夠資本來吸納虧損，還存在疑問。
高槓杆水平還損害了銀行爲經濟增長提供資金的能力。管理上負責任但槓桿很高的銀行，會在放貸時尋求高價值抵押品，比如要求以房產做抵押；或者持有高評級資產。這可能影響歐元區所需的生產性投資。
For these reasons, one must doubt whether the capital in eurozone banks is enough to drive the economy forward. But this is just one part of a still bigger problem: the dramatic weakness of aggregate demand and the slow slide into ultra-low inflation and, quite possibly, deflation. Sounder banks do not necessarily generate faster growth in demand. Indeed, causality goes far more in the opposite former ECB officials have expressed sharply different views about how policy makers should respond. Otmar Issing, the bank’s former chief economist, argues that monetary policy is already too loose from a German point of view and that it would be a mistake for Berlin to loosen fiscal policy, too. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, a former member of the executive board, argues that stronger demand is needed in Germany to prevent the European economy from falling into deflation. ISSING ETC EXCISEDThe vital point is that the eurozone has a single monetary authority, which should take a view of the entire eurozone economy.
Between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of this year, eurozone nominal demand rose by a mere 2.5 per cent (see chart). Nominal gross domestic product grew by 5 per cent over that period. Now assume trend real growth was a mere 1 per cent and inflation 2 per cent (in line with ECB targets). In that case, nominal GDP should have been growing at 3 per cent a year. By the second quarter of 2014, nominal GDP was 13 per cent below this objective. Under Mr Issing, the ECB looked at monetary aggregates as well. In the six years to September 30 2014, broad money (M3) increased by 9.6 per cent, a compound annual rate of 1.5 per cent. On both measures, the ECB has failed.
The same goes for inflation. Suppose the ECB intends to hit its inflation target of close to, but below, 2 per cent. When several important member countries need to improve their competitiveness, their inflation should be well below German levels. If that is to happen while the average remains close to 2 per cent, core inflation needs to exceed 3 per cent in Germany (and other surplus countries). In fact, it is just 1.2 per cent in Germany. This suggests domestic demand is far too weak in the eurozone as a whole, including in the surplus countries, the most important of which is of course Germany.
The question, however, is how to achieve higher demand growth in the eurozone and creditor countries. Experience in the US and UK suggests that unconventional monetary policy might work. But the ECB is hampered by the constraints (perceived and actual) on purchases of government debt. If Germany is opposed to such purchases, then its opposition to active fiscal policy as well, even when it is able to borrow at close to zero real interest rates over 30 years, ensures continued eurozone stagnation. That just cannot make sense.
It is essential not to make too much of the stress tests and asset quality review. Yes, they are real improvements. But they do not mean that eurozone banks will now drive growth. They still have too little capital for that. More important, the eurozone lacks a credible strategy for reigniting demand. If much of the German policy elite continues to deny this is even a problem, the crisis of the eurozone must remain unresolved. That is a disaster.
基於這些原因，人們不得不懷疑歐元區銀行是否擁有足夠的資本拉動經濟增長。但這只是一個更大的問題的一部分：歐元區的總需求極度疲弱，正在緩慢滑入極低的通脹水平，且很有可能出現通縮。更健康的銀行並不一定會加快需求的增長。實際上，因果關係在很大程度上與此相反。
關於政策制定者應該如何應對這些問題，兩位歐洲央行前官員給出了截然不同的觀點。歐洲央行前首席經濟學家奧特馬爾•伊辛(Otmar Issing)認爲，從德國的角度來看，貨幣政策已經太寬鬆了，再放鬆財政政策對德國來說將是錯誤的選擇。而歐洲央行執委會委員洛倫佐•比尼•斯馬吉(Lorenzo Bini Smaghi)則認爲，德國需要更強勁的需求，來防止歐洲經濟滑入通縮。關鍵在於歐元區擁有單一的貨幣當局，而這個貨幣當局應該縱覽歐元區經濟的全局。
從2008年第1季度到今年第2季度，歐元區的名義需求僅增長了2.5%（如圖）。同期名義國內生產總值(GDP)增長了5%。現在，假定趨勢實際增長率僅爲1%，通脹率爲2%（與歐洲央行的目標一致），在這種情況下，名義GDP的年增長率應該達到3%。
截至2014年第2季度，實際上的名義GDP離這個目標還差13%。伊辛任職期間，歐洲央行還關注貨幣總量的情況。在截至今年9月30日的6年間，廣義貨幣(M3)增加了9.6%，複合年增長率爲1.5%。從這兩個衡量指標來看，歐洲央行都失敗了。
通脹方面也是如此。假設歐洲央行希望實現接近2%、但仍在2%以下的通脹率目標。如果幾個重要的成員國需要改善它們的競爭力，它們的通脹率就應該遠低於德國的通脹水平。如果這些條件要成立，又要保證平均通脹率接近2%，德國（和其他盈餘國家）的核心通脹率需要超過3%。而事實上，德國的核心通脹率僅爲1.2%。這表明，包括盈餘國家（其中最重要的國家當然是德國）在內，整個歐元區的內部需求太過疲弱。
然而，問題在於如何提高歐元區和債權國的需求增長率。美國和英國的經驗表明，非常規的貨幣政策或許能奏效。但歐洲央行在購買國債方面受到（認知和實際上的）約束的阻礙。如果德國反對歐洲央行購買國債，那麼它對積極財政政策的同樣反對（即使它能以接近於零的實際利率在30年期限上借款），必將使歐元區持續陷入停滯。這是毫無道理的。
重要的是，我們不應太高估壓力測試和資產質量評估的作用。是的，它們是實實在在的進步。但它們的結果並不意味着歐元區的銀行將拉動增長。銀行擁有的資本還是太少，以至於它們無法做到這一點。最重要的是，歐元區缺少一種提振需求的可信策略。如果德國政策精英中的不少人繼續否認這的確是個問題，歐元區的危機必然無法解決。那將是一場災難。
