歐元區進一步趨向解體
In the past eight months before Cyprus erupted people have frequently reminded me, often with a smirk, of a forecast I made in late November 2011. On these pages, I declared that eurozone leaders had 10 days to save the euro. I made an ultimately similar, though less dramatic, prediction in 2006 when I wrote that Romano Prodi’s administration offered Italy’s last chance to achieve a sustainable position in the eurozone.
塞浦路斯危機爆發之前的8個月裏，人們經常面帶得意的笑容提起我在2011年11月末曾做的預測。在那篇文章中，我斷言歐元區領導人只有10天的時間來拯救歐元。2006年的時候，我也做過類似但卻沒有這麼極端的預測，當時我寫道，羅馬諾??普羅迪(Romano Prodi)政府爲意大利提供了在歐元區獲得持久地位的最後機會。Mr Prodi’s administration did not deliver. The 10 days in 2011 passed without action. It is 2013, the euro is still there, Italy is still in it – and I am still making forecasts. Undeterred, I will double down today. A eurozone that compromises countries as diverse as Germany and Cyprus is not sustainable, even if the EU and Cyprus manage to find a last-minute compromise. An operational banking union that comprises supervision, resolution and deposit insurance would have been a minimally sufficient condition to make a divergent monetary work against the odds. It would have solved the problems of the Cypriot banks for sure. But the eurozone does not have such a banking union. It will not have such a banking union in five years. Germany rejects it flat out on the grounds that it is too expensive for the German taxpayer. Ironically, Cyprus would also reject it as it would kill the country’s business model as an offshore centre for foreign deposits. Whatever banking union will ultimately emerge in thelong run will be irrelevant to this crisis.
但普羅迪政府卻並沒有交出滿意答卷。2011年的那10天歐元區也沒有任何行動。到了2013年，歐元依然存在，意大利也依然留在歐元區。而我，也依然在預測。現在我毫不畏懼，並且會翻倍下注。一個包括德國和塞浦路斯這樣差異明顯的國家的歐元區是不可持續的，即使歐盟(EU)和塞浦路斯能夠達成最後一刻的妥協。一個包括監督、清盤機制和存款保險的銀行業聯盟，是確保存在分歧的貨幣體系克服各種艱難險阻的最低條件。它肯定能夠解決塞浦路斯銀行的問題。但歐元區卻沒有這樣的銀行業聯盟，五年內也不會有。德國斷然拒絕，原因是對於德國納稅人來說代價太高。頗有諷刺意味的是，塞浦路斯也會拒絕這一聯盟，因爲它會破壞該國作爲外國儲蓄離岸中心的商業模式。長期來看，不管最終會出現什麼樣的銀行業聯盟，都與這場危機無關。What happened in Cyprus last week is not a deep cause of anything. But it is a perfect illustration of the eurozone’s collective action problem. This latest escalation began with the dangerous agreement to bail-in insured depositors. Eurozone officials are as legally literate as they are economically illiterate. Their ever so brilliant idea was not to haircut insured deposits of under 100,000, but simply to tax them. They did not realise that if they take away the promise inherent in deposit insurance, they are in default, and in danger of starting a bank run.
上週塞浦路斯發生的情況並不會是任何危機的根本導火索，但卻非常清晰地暴露了歐元區集體行動存在的問題。事態的最新升級始於一項危險的協議，即讓受保險保護的儲蓄者提供內部紓困。歐元區官員們有多精通法律，在經濟上就有多無知。他們“聰明透頂”的想法不是減記10萬歐元以下受保險保護的存款，而是對它們徵稅。他們沒有意識到，如果他們拿走存款保險中固有的承諾，他們就是在違約，可能引發銀行擠兌的風險。
The Cypriot parliament was right to reject this mad deal. But the Cypriot government then committed three subsequent blunders. The first was the decision by President Nicos Anastasiades to seek help from Russia. Instead of working with the eurozone, he worked against it. The Germans, in particular, saw this as an openly hostile move. It was also ill-judged because the Russians rejected the offer. The second was the decision not to communicate with the European finance ministers and the euro working group for three critical days last week. The third was the Cypriot government’s proposal on Thursday to create a sovereign wealth fund backed by a raid on the pension fund and other state assets. On Friday Angela Merkel swiftly dismissed it.
塞浦路斯議會拒絕這份瘋狂的協議是正確的(編者注：歐盟與塞浦路斯於本週一達成救助協議)。但塞浦路斯政府接着卻犯了三個大錯。第一就是總統尼科斯??阿納斯塔夏季斯(Nicos Anastasiades)決定尋求俄羅斯的幫助。他並沒有與歐元區合作，而是對着來。德國尤其將此看作一個公開的敵對之舉。同時這也是欠思考的，因爲俄羅斯拒絕提供幫助。第二，在上週關鍵的三天內，塞浦路斯政府決定不與歐洲各國財長以及歐元工作組對話。第三，塞浦路斯政府上週四決定從養老基金和其他國家資產中緊急抽取資金創建一個主權財富基金。第二天安格拉??默克爾(Angela Merkel)就立即否定了它。What happened last week is a fitting example of European political leaders, in a most unprofessional pursuit of narrow national interests, failing to defend the common good.
上週發生的情況突顯了歐洲政治領導人物的典型特徵，他們以一種非常不專業的方式追求狹隘的國家利益，卻損害了共同利益。The main risk I want to emphasise is, however, not a big accident. It might happen, of course. But I suspect the single biggest risk ultimately stems from the eurozone’s repeated policy errors. Their effect is slow but cumulative.
然而，我想強調的主要風險並不是發生一次嚴重事件的風險。當然這是可能發生的，但我認爲最大的風險最終來自歐元區不斷重複的政治錯誤。它們的影響比較緩慢，卻是累積性的。Of those, the most damaging has been the policy of asymmetric adjustment through austerity. Banks in Cyprus are falling now because the Greek state and Greek banks fell earlier, and because the eurozone forced a private-sector involvement. In Italy, it was also austerity that turned a recession into a depression. That, in turn, transformed an anti-euro, anti-establishment protest movement into the single largest political party in the Italian parliament at the last elections. There is a good chance that its leader, Beppe Grillo, could end up with an absolute majority if Italy were to hold another round of elections later this year.
毫無疑問，最具破壞性的是通過緊縮來進行非對稱調整的政策。當前塞浦路斯銀行紛紛陷入困境，是因爲希臘政府和希臘銀行之前陷入困境，也因爲歐元區強行把私營領域牽涉進來。意大利也是由於緊縮而從衰退步入蕭條。正是因爲這個原因，在最近的選舉中，一個反對歐元、反對傳統政黨的抗議運動成爲意大利議會中最大的單一政黨。如果今年晚些時候意大利舉行另一輪選舉，該政黨領導人貝佩??格里洛(Beppe Grillo)很可能會贏得絕對多數選票。If austerity in the south had at least been compensated by fiscal expansion in the north, the overall fiscal stance of the eurozone would have been macroeconomically neutral. But since the north joined the austerity, the eurozone ended up with a primary fiscal surplus in a recession. In such an environment, economic adjustment simply does not take place. Without that, there can be no solution to the crisis.
如果歐洲南部的緊縮至少能夠得到北部財政擴張的彌補，那麼歐元區的整體財政立場在宏觀經濟層面上就會趨向中立。但由於北部也加入了緊縮，結果歐元區在衰退中反而實現了基礎財政盈餘。在這種環境下，一般不會發生經濟調整。而如果沒有調整的話，危機就沒有解決方案。I have believed for some time that it is impossible for Germany, Finland and the Netherlands to be in a monetary union with Cyprus, Greece and Portugal. Either the two sides agree to adjust more symmetrically, politically and economically, or this experiment should end.
一段時間以來我一直認爲，德國、芬蘭、荷蘭不可能與塞浦路斯、希臘、葡萄牙在同一個貨幣聯盟中。如果雙方不能夠更加平衡地在政治和經濟上做出調整，這一嘗試就只能結束。The prediction I made in November 2011, and which I am repeating today, is that it will probably end one day, though that day may still be a long way off. I cannot exclude the possibility that the various governments will do the right thing, but three years of crisis management suggest otherwise.
2011年11月我所做出的預測就是，有一天歐元區很可能會終結，儘管這一天或許依然很遙遠——今天我還要重複這樣的預測。不能排除各國政府會採取正確行動的可能性，但三年以來的危機管理顯示的正相反。With the current policy, they will need force to keep it going against the interests of the people. You do not need to be a eurosceptic to conclude that such a monetary union is also deeply immoral.
在當前政策下，要讓歐元區違揹人民的利益存在下去，他們得使用強制力。就算你不是歐元懷疑論者，也會給這樣一個貨幣聯盟貼上“極不道德”的標籤。
