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世界上買不起房產的人,中國佔最大比重

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ing-bottom: 93.78%;">世界上買不起房產的人,中國佔最大比重

Move aside, Tokyo. Seven of the world's ten most expensive markets -- Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Tianjin, Guangzhou and Chongqing -- are in China

除了東京,世界上房價最貴的十座城市,中國就佔了七個,分別是:北京、上海、深圳、香港、天津、廣州和重慶。

Five big Chinese cities rank among the priciest housing markets in the world, surpassing notoriously expensive cities like Tokyo, London and New York, based on calculations by the International Monetary Fund. In fact, seven out of 10 of the world's least affordable markets--Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Tianjin, Guangzhou and Chongqing--are now in China. Here's a look at how China's biggest cities stack up, via Sober Look:

在中國,有五座城市的房價超過了世界上最貴的一些城市,比如東京、倫敦和紐約。根據國際貨幣基金組織,實際上,世界房價最貴的十座城市中,中國佔了七個,分別是:北京、上海、深圳、香港、天津、廣州和重慶。

Note that that the price-to-wage ratio, which measures median housing prices in a given city against median disposable incomes, reflects affordability rather than absolute property value. This means the mid-range price of an apartment in New York is 6.2 times more than what a typical family makes in a year. By comparison, it would take nearly a quarter-century of earnings to buy a pad in Beijing's capital outright.

工資價格比率是衡量某個城市住房可支配收入的中位數,也可以衡量支付能力,不是絕對值。這意味着說,在紐約的一所公寓平均價格差不多是普通家庭一年收入的6.2倍。而在北京購買房子差不多需要25年的收入。

Residential property is a big mess for the Chinese government--and it's not going away. Last month, prices on new homes leapt 7.4% in June 2012--the biggest uptick since last December.

居民住宅是中國的一個爛攤子,並且不會立刻消失。上個月,房價上漲了7.4%,這是過去十二個月以來最大上揚。

In short, policies to curb housing inflation aren't working. That's worrying news for the government; housing prices are a major source of public resentment. The danger isn't just the threat of popular unrest, though: It's that soaring property prices make people feel less wealthy and less inclined to consume. And that's exactly what the government needs them to do in order to wean the economy off its dependency on exports and credit-driven investment.

總之,遏制房價的政策不起作用,這也是政府的擔憂。住房價格也是普通民衆不滿的一個主要來源,房價飆升讓人感覺不夠富不願意消費,這也是政府需要擺脫對出口和信貸驅動投資的依賴。

That brings us to the central government's dilemma: Property investment fuels a big chunk of China's GDP. Here's a look at that, also via Sober Look:

這也給政府帶來了困境:中國國內生產總值很大一部分來自房地產投資的驅動。

Sure, the announcement over the weekend that the government will stop evaluating party officials solely on the basis of their contribution to growing GDP--China's probably the only country in the world to announce GDP targets as a matter of policy--is truly momentous. If they're off the hook for hitting targets, it means that local government cadres have less of an incentive to shunt investment to shady property deals to prop up their numbers. It also could make them less reliant on land parcel sales--the prices of which have been rising--to fund their budgets. Part of China's sky-high housing prices comes from this dependency, as we've highlighted in the past. That's both driven up prices and encouraged over-investment in the sector via shadow lending. But the government still needs something to drive its economy while it waits for its households to start consuming.

本週,政府宣佈停止只用國內生產總值增長來評價貢獻,中國是世界上唯一一個公佈GDP作爲政策目標的國家,這個意義重大。如果不以此爲唯一目標,也就意味着說地方政府不鼓勵依靠房地產投資數量來支撐,也可以減少對於土地的依賴。房價一直在上漲,高房價一部分來自於這樣的依賴,我們在過去強調,這是驅動價格上漲和過度投資的原因,甚至是影子貸款部門。政府需要推動經濟發展的同時,需要更多家庭開始消費。

Finally, a tanking housing market would probably leave dozens of developers--and their local government confederates--underwater. That could be cataclysmic for Chinese banks that have lent willy-nilly to to developers.

最後,房地產市場可能會留下幾十家開發商,銀行不管三七二十一給開發商貸款,這可能是災難性的。

In other words, a drop-off in property investment could cause a big drop in GDP growth, just as cooling the market risks causing a spike in bad debt. Will these costs be more than the central government is willing to risk?

換句話說,房地產投資放緩會導致GDP增長大幅下降,市場降溫可能導致壞賬激增。中國政府願意承擔這些風險嗎?