特朗普勝選是否對中國有利
For many Chinese, the US elections were being depicted as a test of the virtues of the American model of democracy.
對於許多中國人，美國大選被描繪成一場對美式民主優越性的考驗。
The process became an easy target for Beijing’s propagandists to illustrate what they see as a flawed political system, with its internal divisions and a costly, time-consuming election that yielded two candidates both judged untrustworthy by the majority of American voters.
美國的選舉過程成了中國宣傳者的一個輕而易舉的靶子，可以暴露他們所稱的一種有缺陷的政治制度，不但內部分裂，還搞出昂貴耗時的選舉程序，結果卻產生被大多數美國選民評判爲都不可信任的兩名候選人。
But as unexpected as the outcome was for the Chinese, there is an old saying: Be careful what you wish for.
但是，無論選舉結果多麼出乎中國人意料，正如老話說，小心你想要什麼。
Donald Trump’s victory may have pleased those Hillary Clinton regrettably referred to during the campaign as the basket of deplorables but what Beijing really wanted was more nuanced.
唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)的勝利可能取悅那些被希拉里.克林頓(Hillary Clinton)在競選期間遺憾地稱爲一羣可憐蟲的人，但北京方面真正想要的是更爲微妙的東西。
The Chinese public was evenly split between Mrs Clinton and Mr Trump in pre-election surveys but their counterparts in other east Asian countries overwhelmingly favoured Mrs Clinton.
在選前調查中，中國公衆對希拉里和特朗普的態度是對半分的，而他們的東亞鄰居們大多支持希拉里。
For China, Mrs Clinton was a known product but seen as personally antagonistic towards the country; Mr Trump was an unknown product but as a businessman was judged, rightly or wrongly, less likely to get involved in China’s internal or external affairs.
對中國而言，希拉里是個已知產物，但認爲她對中國持敵對態度；特朗普是個未知產物，但作爲一個商人，他被評判爲（無論對錯）不太可能插手中國的內部或外部事務。
For officials dealing with the US, the choice depended on whether one viewed the relationship through an economic or a geostrategic prism.
對於要與美國打交道的官員，選擇取決於此人是通過經濟視角，還是地緣政治視角來看待中美關係。
For three decades, Beijing’s primary concern was sustaining rapid and stable economic growth and the avoidance of external conflict.
30年來，中國政府的首要關切是保持快速、穩定的經濟增長，避免外部衝突。
This was facilitated by America’s open trade and investment policies and the comfort blanket given by a military presence that moderated tensions and deterred regional conflicts.
爲此創造條件的是美國的開放貿易和投資政策，以及美國軍事存在所提供的安全感——美國的軍事存在緩和了緊張局勢，阻止了地區衝突。
This clearly benefited China.
中國顯然受益匪淺。
The factors that shaped this environment, however, have changed over the past decade.
然而塑造這一環境的因素在過去10年發生了變化。
China’s rise as an economic power has led to more assertive policies to establish what Beijing calls a new kind of great power relations that has altered its geostrategic objectives.
中國崛起爲經濟強國，隨之帶來更爲強硬的政策，希望建立北京方面所稱的新型大國關係，這意味着中國改變了其地緣戰略目標。
For the leadership, the choices are now more complex.
對於中國領導人，現在的選擇更爲複雜。
Despite the characteristically ambiguous official statements, those at the helm of the party-state had strong views about both candidates.
儘管其官方聲明一如既往地模棱兩可，但這個黨國的掌權者對兩位總統候選人都有強烈觀點。
Mrs Clinton’s perceived predictability and pragmatism were viewed in the context of her seemingly aggressive views on ideological issues such as democracy and human rights as well as her support for a strong US role in providing the security architecture underpinning the pivot back to Asia.
在中方眼裏，看待希拉里的可預見性和務實，要放在這樣一個背景下，即她對民主和人權等意識形態問題抱有貌似咄咄逼人的觀點，以及她支持美國在提供支撐重返亞洲戰略的安全架構方面扮演強大角色。
This assertiveness, coupled with her record of criticising China as first lady, senator and then secretary of state, led Beijing to view a Clinton presidency as a credible threat to Chinese interests.
希拉里的這種強硬態度，加上她作爲第一夫人、參議員和國務卿時批評中國的記錄，讓北京方面認爲希拉里若當選，將對中國的利益構成可信威脅。
Mr Trump’s candidacy was more complicated.
特朗普這個候選人則更加複雜。
His public statements on trade and investment relations with Beijing were even harsher than Mrs Clinton’s and featured more centrally in his election platform.
他對於美中貿易和投資關係的公開言論比希拉里更加刺耳，而且這些問題在他的競選平臺上佔據更爲中心的位置。
He had consistently placed much of the blame for America’s economic malaise squarely on China’s shoulders.
他一再將美國的經濟不景氣大半歸咎於中國。
And his threat to impose a 45 per cent tariff on imported Chinese goods inspired China’s finance minister publicly to call Mr Trump an irrational type.
他威脅要對中國輸美商品徵收45%的關稅，令中國財政部長公開稱特朗普屬於不理性的那類人。
Thus, many of Beijing’s economic authorities were in favour of Mrs Clinton rather than the Republican to continue the dialogue with the Obama administration on trade and investment issues.
因此，中國政府經濟部門的許多人支持希拉里而不是特朗普，以繼續中國與奧巴馬政府關於貿易和投資問題的對話。
However, Beijing is used to the ritual of US presidential candidates competing to show who can be tougher on China, yet after the elections taking a more conciliatory approach — so who won would probably not matter.
不過，北京已習慣了美國總統候選人的套路：在競選期間爭着表現誰能對中國更強硬，但在當選後會採取比較和緩的姿態，因此誰贏了很可能並不重要。
What will happen with the US — China dialogue on trade and foreign investment issues is uncertain.
美中關於貿易和外國投資問題的對話將如何發展是個未知數。
The Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was being sold tactically by the Obama administration as a means to stop China from setting the trade agenda, would ironically seem less likely to be ratified now given Mr Trump’s views on trade.
奧巴馬政府曾戰術性地兜售《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》(TPP)，作爲阻止中國製定貿易議程的一種手段；具有諷刺意味的是，鑑於特朗普對貿易的觀點，TPP似乎不太可能獲得批准。
He may find the Bilateral Investment Treaty under negotiation a more attractive vehicle to engage Beijing given his claims that China’s investment regime has not been fair to American companies.
考慮到他聲稱中國的投資制度對美國企業不公平，他可能會覺得正在談判的雙邊投資條約(Bilateral Investment Treaty)是接觸北京的更有吸引力的工具。
The reality is that liberalisation would be in the interests of both sides.
現實是自由化將符合雙方利益。
For China’s top leadership, however, what matters more are the geostrategic implications.
然而，對於中國的最高領導層，更重要的是地緣戰略影響。
Some see a Trump victory as a chance to realign the regional balance of power in favour of China.
有些人認爲特朗普的勝利是一個機會，可以讓區域力量均衡朝着有利於中國的方向調整。
The latter’s perceived aggressiveness in East Asia has elevated the potential for maritime conflicts stemming from the island disputes; a US president-elect who reportedly considers most of his country’s allies as free riders who do nothing to contribute to US national security may mean an America less inclined to intervene in regional affairs.
後者在世人眼中在東亞的挑釁行爲，已經提高了因島嶼爭端引發海上衝突的可能性；而據報道認爲絕大多數盟國都在搭便車、對美國國家安全毫無貢獻的特朗普入主白宮，可能意味着美國不那麼傾向於干預地區事務。
If so, key players such as Japan and South Korea may decide to go their own way in developing a nuclear capability.
如果是這樣，日本和韓國等關鍵大國可能會決定自行發展核武能力。
And the Asean nations might seek to accommodate China’s regional interests even more than the recent visits to Beijing of the heads of state of the Philippines and Malaysia have signalled.
東盟國家可能尋求遷就中國的地區利益，其身段之柔軟，甚至會超過近期菲律賓和馬來西亞國家元首訪問北京所傳遞的信號。
While all this could mean a geopolitical opening for China to increase its presence in the region, it could also lead to a downward spiral of protectionist economic policies and a rearming of protagonists in which there are no winners.
雖然這一切可能意味着中國獲得一個地緣政治突破口，能夠加大自己在地區的存在，但這也可能帶來保護主義經濟政策的螺旋式下降，以及一場沒有贏家的區域軍備競賽。
Only history will reveal whether Beijing got what it wished for.
只有歷史才能展示北京方面是否如願以償。
