克里米亞與烏克蘭:西方必須與俄羅斯談判
In the west, the conversation is dominated by discussion of how to punish and isolate Russia for its role in the invasion and annexation of Crimea. That is a reaction not a strategy. A strategy begins with a clear understanding of the operational objective.
面對俄羅斯在入侵和吞併克里米亞中的所作所爲，如何懲罰和孤立俄羅斯主導了眼下西方的輿論。這是一種反應，而不是一種策略。要拿出一種策略，首先必須清晰地認識行動的目標。A western strategy should not set as its objective the rollback of the annexation of Crimea to force the peninsula back into Ukraine. Michael McFaul, the former US ambassador to Russia, has argued that the Crimean case should be treated the way Washington treated the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics: permanent non-recognition with the professed goal of eventual rollback. Such a position is unsound. The circumstances of the two episodes are quite different.
西方的策略不應着眼於迫使俄羅斯把克里米亞吐出來、還給烏克蘭。前美國駐俄羅斯大使邁克爾•麥克福爾(Michael McFaul)主張，華盛頓方面應該像對待1940年俄羅斯併吞波羅的海國家那樣，對待此次的克里米亞事件，即：永不承認克里米亞新的地位，並公開表示將致力於逆轉這一變化。這一主張是站不住腳的。這兩起事件的情況大相徑庭。Many western experts knew the Crimean portion of the early 1990s settlement had a tenuous character, given the status of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Some also recall the arbitrary background of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s attachment of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, while these territories were parts of the Soviet Union. This bit of caprice had its roots in several land-grabs that Khrushchev had sought for his Ukrainian domain back when he was its Soviet Communist party boss. Never part of Ukraine or independent, the Crimea had just been liberated from German military occupation when Khrushchev added it to his wishlist. One of Khrushchev’s biographers recounts him telling a Ukrainian colleague: “Ukraine is in ruins but everybody wants something from it. Now what if it received the Crimea in return?” Stalin turned him down. But 10 years later, shortly after Khrushchev took Stalin’s place, he had his way.
西方許多專家之前就知道，鑑於俄羅斯黑海艦隊的地位，上世紀90年代初的協議中關於克里米亞的部分比較脆弱。一些專家還記得，蘇聯領導人尼基塔•赫魯曉夫(Nikita Khrushchev)1954年非常輕率地將克里米亞併入了烏克蘭，當時烏克蘭和克里米亞都屬於蘇聯。這種輕率並非孤例，擔任蘇共中央第一書記時，赫魯曉夫曾輕率地將好幾塊土地併入了他的家鄉烏克蘭。克里米亞以前從未屬於過烏克蘭，也從來都不是一個獨立國家。當年，克里米亞剛剛從德軍佔領下解放，赫魯曉夫就將它加入了自己的“心願清單”。赫魯曉夫的一位傳記作者回憶道，赫魯曉夫曾對一名來自烏克蘭的同僚說：“烏克蘭眼下一片廢墟，但每個人都在打它的主意。把克里米亞給它、作爲回報怎麼樣？”斯大林(Stalin)拒絕了他的提議。但10年後，赫魯曉夫接替斯大林之位後不久，就實施了自己當年的想法。
Given that there will now be some revision of the post-cold war diplomatic settlement, the objective of the western strategy should be to set firm limits on any further revisions in eastern Europe. In the short run, the strategy imposes sanctions on Russians for outlaw behaviour. The strategy would also entail non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea. Recognising this annexation could come later, if it is part of a larger diplomatic understanding in which Russia chooses to rejoin a system of common security.
鑑於冷戰後的外交協議如今將面臨修訂，西方不應將確保東歐格局不發生任何變化作爲自身策略的目標。短期而言，西方的策略是對俄羅斯實施制裁，以懲罰該國的非法行爲。該策略也必須包括拒不承認克里米亞已成爲俄羅斯的一部分。如果未來西方與俄羅斯達成更廣泛的外交諒解協議，俄羅斯選擇重新加入共同安全體系，那麼作爲回報，西方也可以承認克里米亞是俄羅斯的一部分。Agreement? With Russia? With Putin? One could argue that Russia has already just torn up at least one such understanding. That includes the Budapest memorandum of 1994, in which it agreed to safeguard Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Russia also violated other agreements to avoid the use of force in changing international borders.
跟俄羅斯、普京談協議？有人可能會說，俄羅斯剛剛撕毀了不止一份諒解協議，包括1994年的《布達佩斯安全保障備忘錄》(Budapest memorandum)。根據該備忘錄，俄羅斯同意保衛烏克蘭的領土完整。俄羅斯還違反了其他有關避免使用武力改變國際邊界的協議。This sceptical argument will not wear well. The issue is not one of trust. The situation for Ukraine and its neighbours is ominous. A security structure must be built. A new diplomatic understanding about borders should be set in place. Alongside it there will need to be other efforts to shore up Ukraine and neighbouring states – politically, economically and militarily.
這種懷疑主義論調肯定是禁不起推敲的。眼下的問題不是信任。烏克蘭及其鄰國的情況很不妙。眼下必須建立一種安全框架。必須促使各方就邊界問題達成一項新的外交諒解協議。此外，還必須拿出其他舉措，在政治、經濟和軍事上支持烏克蘭及其鄰國。Such a strategy requires some tough intelligence assessments about Ukraine. The loss of Crimea will change the precarious political balance in the country. The remaining pro-Russian factions will be recalculating their prospects and their choices. Ukraine’s friends should judge carefully what the durable, sustainable borders will be.
這樣一種策略必須建立在對烏克蘭進行嚴格情報評估的基礎上。失去克里米亞將改變該國脆弱的政治平衡。剩餘的親俄派將重新考量他們的前景和選擇。烏克蘭的盟友應謹慎判斷，可持久、可維持的國界線是怎樣的。Some suggest Kiev and its friends should offer Moscow proposals for the “neutralisation” or “Finlandisation” of Ukraine. Bad advice. An agreement legitimising such great power involvement in the character and behaviour of Ukraine’s government could be very dangerous.
有人提議，烏克蘭政府及其盟友應該向莫斯科方面表示，烏克蘭願意“中立”或“與俄羅斯親近”。這是個壞建議。用協議形式使大國對烏克蘭政府性質和行爲的影響合法化，可能非常危險。As the current flush of excitement passes, Russian leaders will be living with a redoubled legacy of suspicion among their neighbours. To cite one consequence: the Budapest memorandum of 1994 was agreed to persuade Kiev to give up its former Soviet nuclear weapons. Tearing that up means Ukraine could claim to be entitled to re-evaluate those non-proliferation commitments. There are also large debt, property, and energy issues in play – among others.
隨着眼下的興奮褪去，俄羅斯領導人將面對鄰國對其加倍的防備。就說一點影響：1994年的《布達佩斯安全防衛備忘錄》是爲說服烏克蘭政府放棄前蘇聯的核武而達成的。撕毀該備忘錄意味着，烏克蘭可以宣稱，它有權重新審視不擴散核武的承諾。此外，還會有大量債務、房地產和能源問題，等等。Russia will eventually need a new, durable international settlement that reassures neighbours, if only a little. Ukraine will eventually need such a settlement, too. That is why western strategy today should be guided by a coalition plan that looks ahead to the future, deliberately setting the table now for the next stage of work.
俄羅斯最終將需要一份新的、可持久的國際協議，以安撫鄰國——哪怕可能效果有限。烏克蘭最終也需要這樣一份協議。正因如此，眼下西方策略應該着眼於一份面向未來的合作方案，有意識地爲下一階段的工作做好準備。The writer is a professor of history at the University of Virginia and former counsellor of the US Department of State
本文作者是弗吉尼亞大學(University of Virginia)歷史學教授，美國國防部前顧問
