破解中國債務謎團 中國日益攀升的債務指標
Concerns about China’s ballooning debt indicators have been cycling on and off for nearly a decade.
近10年來，對中國日益攀升的債務指標的擔憂一直在周而復始地出現。
BIS put out an alert in September about China’s increasing credit to GDP gap, a warning that the pace was excessive relative to historical trends.
今年9月，國際清算銀行(BIS)就中國不斷增大的信貸規模/GDP缺口(Credit-to-GDP gap)發出警告，稱其增大的節奏相對於歷史趨勢過高了。
Add to this worry the dependence of some banks on wholesale borrowing and re-emergence of shadow-banking
加劇這種擔心的是，一些銀行依賴批發借款，而影子銀行卷土重來。
and it is easy to understand why some observers have raised the possibility of a destabilising Lehman moment.
因此，不難理解一些觀察人士爲何提出中國出現破壞穩定的雷曼時刻(Lehman moment)的可能性。
Yet predictions of an imminent collapse seem to come and go with the seasons.
然而，有關馬上就要崩潰的預測似乎就像季節那樣來來去去。
Part of the explanation is that China’s debt is largely the result of state-owned banks lending to state entities.
對此，部分解釋是中國的債務在很大程度上是國有銀行向國有實體放貸的結果。
Given the government’s strong financial position, there is less risk that isolated defaults or bank runs could derail the financial system.
考慮到中國政府強大的財政實力，孤立的違約或銀行擠兌事件搞亂金融體系的風險較低。
China’s problem also differs from other crisis cases because of the unique role that escalating land prices have played in shaping debt indicators and asset values.
此外，由於中國日漸攀升的地價在債務指標和資產價值現狀的形成中扮演着獨特角色，中國的問題也與其他危機案例不太一樣。
The impact of rising land prices is unique to China because an extensive private property market only emerged after housing was privatised and land auctions were initiated a decade ago.
地價攀升的影響是中國獨有的現象，這是因爲中國大規模私人房產市場只是在10年前住房私有化和土地拍賣啓動之後纔出現的。
In the aftermath, credit expansion supported a fivefold increase in land prices in the major cities (eightfold in dollar terms).
在那之後，信貸擴張支撐了大城市地價上漲五倍（以美元計算漲幅高達八倍）。
This in turn has caused fixed asset investments to soar from 45 to 80 per cent of GDP.
這進而導致固定資產與國內生產總值(GDP)之比從45%激增至80%。
But what counts as investment for GDP purposes is gross fixed capital formation which excludes the value of land and transfers of existing property and as a share of GDP has hovered around 45 per cent.
不過，就GDP計算而言，投資指的是固定資本形成總額，該指標剔除土地價值和現有物業的轉讓，其與GDP之比一直徘徊在45%左右。
While the credit surge has driven up debt indicators, it has not spurred GDP growth.
儘管信貸激增推高了債務指標，但並未刺激GDP的增長。
Nevertheless, the credit expansion has contributed to what economists often refer to positively as financial deepening as markets are discovering the value of land based assets (housing and commercial property) formerly hidden in a socialist system.
不過，隨着市場不斷髮現此前埋沒於社會主義制度的基於土地的資產（住房和商用物業）的價值，信貸擴張推動了經濟學家們往往給予正面評價的金融深化。
This suggests that the debt problem might be overstated.
這似乎表明債務問題也許言過其實了。
A more informative risk indicator might be the ratio of debt to asset values.
更說明問題的風險指標或許是債務與資產價值之比。
This ratio was highlighted recently by Nomura analysts.
野村證券(Nomura)分析師最近曾強調這一比率。
As seen in Figure 1 (below) this ratio has been declining steadily over the past decade because of the increasing value of land based assets, even as the debt-to-GDP ratio has soared.
如圖1所示，由於基於土地的資產價值不斷攀升，過去10年這一比率不斷下降，儘管債務與GDP之比出現飆升。
Whether this might eventually trigger a financial crisis depends on the sustainability of these asset values.
最終是否會引發金融危機，要看這些資產價值的可持續性。
Two groups have been affected: households and enterprises.
兩個羣體受到影響：家庭和企業。
In the case of households, housing affordability as measured by the ratio of personal incomes to housing prices has been improving and excess inventories have been declining.
從家庭方面來說，以個人收入與房價之比衡量的住房負擔能力一直在提升，過高庫存一直在下滑。
Thus the possibility of a major collapse in housing prices is low.
因此，房價嚴重崩盤的可能性很低。
Even if housing prices did fall significantly, most households have built up substantial equity positions backed by substantial savings, so the likelihood of a destabilising impact on the financial system is limited.
即使房價確實大幅下跌，多數家庭也在大量儲蓄的支持下，建立了相當大的股權頭寸，因此金融體系受到破壞穩定的衝擊的可能性十分有限。
But rising asset values can have significant negative implications for enterprises if returns on these assets do not keep up with debt servicing costs.
但是，不斷攀升的資產價值可能給企業帶來顯著負面影響——如果這些資產的回報趕不上償債成本。
Profitability is not yet a generalised problem for private companies whose returns on assets are currently about twice that of state-owned (see Figure 2).
對民營企業來說，盈利能力還不是普遍問題，它們目前的資產回報率是國有企業的兩倍（參見圖2）。
Before the financial crisis, however, rates of return for the two groups were nearly the same.
然而，在金融危機之前，兩者的回報率幾乎相同。
The divergence came from the government’s periodic stimulus efforts which led to an excessive expansion in the production capacity of selected state firms.
差距的拉大源自政府的週期性刺激努力，這些努力導致被選中的國企生產力過度擴張。
A consequence has been the emergence of a group of state-owned enterprises, referred to as zombies, that are generating huge losses.
由此導致的一個後果是出現了一個被稱爲殭屍企業的虧損嚴重的國企羣體。
These are typically large companies operating in heavy industries, energy and construction related activities.
這些企業往往是經營重工業、能源和建築相關業務的大企業。
The bad part of the problem is that most of the affected companies are concentrated in the already depressed rust belt regions making the solution politically more difficult.
問題的糟糕之處在於，多數受影響企業集中於已經不景氣的鏽帶老工業區，在政治上加大瞭解決難度。
In some cases, potentially hundreds of thousands of workers need to be relocated and entire towns may become non-viable.
在某些情況下，潛在有數十萬工人需要重新安置，整個城鎮可能難以爲繼。
The good part of the problem is that this is not a widespread phenomenon affecting the vast majority of companies which are private.
問題的有利之處則在於，這不是一種影響在數量上佔絕大多數的民營企業的普遍現象。
The authorities reissued instructions in October to have these zombie companies go bankrupt and their assets liquidated.
今年10月，中國當局再次發出指示，讓這些殭屍企業破產並將其資產清盤。
The needed restructuring is now under way with some recent double-digit cuts in coal and steel production, recapitalisation of banks and outflows of workers to other regions.
目前正在推進必要的重組：煤炭和鋼鐵產量最近削減幅度達到兩位數，銀行開展資本重組，工人外遷至其他地區。
The increase in defaults suggests that the authorities are taking things more seriously.
違約案例增多似乎表明，當局正在更加認真地處理問題。
This has elevated producer prices to positive levels after years of decline.
這些舉措令生產者價格指數在多年下滑之後被推升至正數區間。
The result is an uptick in profit margins and increasing corporate revenues.
結果是利潤率上升，企業營收不斷增加。
In sum what is seen by some as a generalised debt problem is actually more of a restructuring issue involving downsizing of a subset of state-owned enterprises.
總之，一些人眼中的普遍債務問題，實際上在更大程度上是一個重組問題，涉及對一部分國企進行瘦身。
But much more action is needed in this regard before one can be confident that the worst is over.
但是，這方面還需要採取多得多的行動，才能讓人確信最壞的時期已經過去。
