中國地方政府融資平臺捲土重來
China is backsliding on a pledge to impose fiscal discipline on local governments by phasing out borrowing through special-purpose vehicles that allow provinces, cities and counties to skirt restrictions on local debt.
中國正在放棄通過逐步停止地方政府利用融資平臺舉債來加強地方財政紀律的承諾，這些平臺可以讓各省、市、縣繞開對地方舉債的限制。
In landmark policy guidelines two years ago known as Document 43, China’s cabinet stated that borrowing by local government financing vehicles — investment companies owned by the government but ostensibly separate from the fiscal budget — must not increase government debt.
在兩年前出臺的被稱爲43號文的具有里程碑意義的政策指引中，中國國務院規定，地方政府融資平臺(LGFV)——政府旗下的投資公司，但表面上獨立於財政預算——不得新增政府債務。
But after a dip in 2015, off-budget debt has returned this year.
但經歷了2015年的下降後，預算外債務今年又出現了回升。
Net bond issuance by local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) hit Rmb1.07tn ($160bn) through late September, higher than the Rmb946bn issued for all of 2015, according to data from Wind Information.
萬得資訊(Wind Information)的數據顯示，截至9月底，地方政府融資平臺的淨債券發行額達到了1.07萬億元人民幣（合1600億美元），高於2015年全年發行的9460億元人民幣。
The resurgence reflects Chinese policymakers’ efforts to boost the economy through quasi-fiscal spending on infrastructure by state-owned enterprises to buffer a slowdown in manufacturing investment by private groups.
這一回升反映了中國決策者提振經濟的努力，他們試圖利用國有企業對基礎設施的準財政支出緩衝私企製造業投資的放緩。
The International Monetary Fund estimates that China’s augmented fiscal deficit — a figure that includes LGFV borrowing alongside central and local government bonds — will reach 10.1 per cent of GDP in 2016, above the finance ministry’s official deficit target of 3 per cent for 2016.
國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)估計，2016年中國擴大後的財政赤字——包括地方政府融資平臺舉債以及中央和地方政府債券——將達到國內生產總值(GDP)的10.1%，高於財政部爲2016年確立的3%官方赤字目標。
There was some compromise from day one.
從一開始就有一定的妥協。
At the beginning they were talking about completely shutting down LGFVs.
開始，他們說是要徹底關閉地方政府融資平臺。
But in the official document there was no firm deadline, said Zhu Haibin, chief China economist at JPMorgan in Hong Kong. There will be a few years’ grandfathering period.
但在那份官方文件中，沒有嚴格的最後期限，摩根大通(JPMorgan)駐香港首席中國經濟學家朱海濱表示，會有幾年的緩衝期。
Particularly when local governments are facing fundraising difficulties, (LGFV) bonds will pick up.
尤其是在地方政府面臨融資困難之際，（地方政府融資平臺）債券將派上用場。
Local government debt ballooned in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, as Beijing gave local officials free rein to fund infrastructure projects with bank loans, bonds and shadow-bank credit.
2008年金融危機爆發後，由於北京方面允許地方官員自由利用銀行貸款、債券和影子銀行信貸爲基礎設施項目融資，地方政府債務出現了暴漲。
Most local borrowing occurred through LGFVs, whose legal status as corporations with an arms-length relationship to their government owners enabled them to skirt a legal ban on direct borrowing.
大多數地方債務都是通過地方政府融資平臺舉借的，這些平臺既與政府所有者保持密切關係，又擁有公司的法律地位，使得它們能夠避開對於地方政府直接舉債的法律禁令。
Local-government debt totalled Rmb28.2tn at the end of 2015, equal to 41 per cent of gross domestic product, according to the International Monetary Fund.
根據IMF的數據，截至2015年底，地方政府債務共計達28.2萬億元人民幣，相當於GDP的41%。
In a paper published last week by the Brookings Institution, Bai Chong-en, economist at Tshinghua University in Beijing and a member of the Monetary Policy Committee at China’s central bank, found that LGFV spending worsens capital allocation and likely led to a permanent decline in the growth rate of aggregate productivity and GDP.
布魯金斯學會(Brookings Institution)上週發佈的一篇文章中，清華大學(Tshinghua University)經濟學家、中國央行貨幣政策委員會委員白重恩認爲，地方政府融資平臺支出惡化了資本配置，可能導致總生產率增長率及GDP增速的長期下滑。
Realising that the debt surge threatened financial stability, the central government in 2014 moved to impose strict limits on local borrowing.
意識到債務激增將危及金融穩定後，中央政府於2014年開始對地方舉借債務進行嚴格限制。
Under the moniker of open the front door, block the back door, China's parliament revised the budget to allow provincial governments to issue municipal bonds directly for the first time, subject to an annual quota approved by China's legislature.
在修明渠、堵暗道的政策下，全國人大修訂了預算法，首次允許省級政府根據其批准的年度限額直接發行地方政府債務。
Meanwhile, Document 43 appeared to forbid new debt issuance by LGFVs.
與此同時，43號文似乎禁止通過地方政府融資平臺發行新債。
But signs of softening towards LGFV financing appeared within months.
但幾個月內就出現了對於地方政府融資平臺融資態度軟化的跡象。
In March 2015, the cabinet directed banks to continue lending to LGFVs for projects already under way, a climbdown from the outright halt called for several months earlier.
2015年5月，中國國務院指示銀行繼續貸款給地方政府融資平臺支持已啓動項目，這對於幾個月前要求完全停止貸款是一種讓步。
Analysts now say that Document 43 was actually never intended to halt borrowing by LGFVs.
現在，分析師們表示，43號文實際上從未打算停止地方政府融資平臺舉債。
Instead, the goal was to clarify that LGFVs would henceforth maintain a genuinely arms-length relationship to their government owners, meaning their obligations would no longer be government debt.
相反，文件目的是要澄清，地方政府融資平臺今後將與其政府所有者之間真正保持一定的距離，意味着它們的債務將不再是政府債務。
LGFVs can still borrow from the markets, but investors should be aware that LGFVs are transforming, and their relationship with their owner-government is changing, such that the investors should not take implicit government support for granted, said Ivan Chung, head of greater China credit research at Moody's, the rating agency.
地方政府融資平臺仍然可以從市場上借款，但投資者應該清楚，地方政府融資平臺正在轉型，而且它們與政府所有者之間的關係正在變化，由此投資者不應想當然地認爲政府會提供隱性支持，評級機構穆迪(Moody's)大中華區信貸研究負責人鍾汶權(Ivan Chung)說。
We see more differentiation in pricing for the hundreds of LGFVs in the onshore bond market.
我們看到，在中國國內債券市場上，數百家地方政府融資平臺的定價差距越來越大。
LGFVs belonging to cities, counties and districts from poorer or highly indebted regions are paying higher yields.
更窮或債務更重地區的市、縣和區的地方政府融資平臺，開始給出更高的債券利息。
As with other state-owned enterprises, the government was never been legally responsible for repaying LGFV debts.
正如對待其他國企一樣，政府從來沒有替地方政府融資平臺償還債務的法律責任。
Yet market participants widely understood such loans and bonds as carrying an implicit government guarantee.
然而，市場參與者普遍認爲，地方政府融資平臺的貸款和債券享有隱性政府擔保。
That perception was bolstered by local governments’ frequent practice of providing cash subsidies or asset injections to keep their LGFVs solvent.
地方政府經常提供現金補貼或注入資產，以維持旗下融資平臺的償債能力的做法，加強了這種看法。
Document 43 was meant to mark a new era.
43號文被認爲標誌着一個新紀元。
Following an official audit to reveal the full extent of LGFV borrowing, the ministry of finance last year launched a debt-swap programme to transform LGFV bank loans into newly-legalised municipal bonds.
繼一次揭示地方政府融資平臺債務總規模的官方審計之後，財政部於去年推出了一項債務置換計劃，以把地方政府融資平臺的銀行貸款置換成新合法化的地方政府債券。
In 2015, Rmb3.2tn worth of LGFV loans were swapped for bonds, and this year's target is Rmb5tn.
2015年，3.2萬億元人民幣的地方政府融資平臺貸款被置換爲地方政府債券，而今年的置換目標是5萬億元人民幣。
Analysts say the swap amounts to a one-off amnesty in which implicitly guaranteed LGFV debt is transformed into municipal bonds that are explicit obligations of provincial governments.
分析人士稱，債務置換相當於一次性特赦，得到隱性政府擔保的地方政府融資平臺債務被轉化爲地方政府債券，成爲省級政府的明確債務。
By around 2018, all LGFV bank loans in the latest audit, which covered the end of 2014, will have been transformed.
到2018年左右，上次審計發現的全部地方政府融資平臺銀行貸款（截至2014年底），都將被置換完畢。
For post-2014 debt, LGFVs are supposed to sink or swim on their own.
至於2014年後形成的債務，地方政府融資平臺就要完全靠自己解決了。
The distinctive function of LGFVs versus governments are getting separated.
地方政府融資平臺與政府各自不同的職能被分離開。
The new principal is ‘Whoever uses, borrows; whoever borrows, repays’, said Yan Liqiong, public utilities analyst at China Bond Rating, a local rating agency.
新原則是‘誰用，誰借；誰借，誰還’，中債資信評估有限責任公司(China Bond Rating)的公用事業部分析師閆麗瓊說。
But the IMF remains unconvinced of LGFVs' supposed independence.
但IMF仍不相信地方政府融資平臺的所謂獨立性。
The fund estimates that when LGFV debt is included, China's local government debt will grow by 4.2tn in 2016, far above the official Rmb1.2tn quota for provincial bond issuance this year.
IMF估算，如果計入地方政府融資平臺的債務，2016年中國的地方政府債務將增加4.2萬億元人民幣，遠高於官方規定的今年1.2萬億元人民幣的省級政府發債限額。
Ms Yan believes compromise is inevitable as China seeks to wean itself from off-budget financing amid slowing growth.
閆麗瓊認爲，中國在經濟增速放緩之際尋求戒掉預算外融資，妥協是不可避免的。
With infrastructure construction as an important lever to stabilise the economy, investment demand is very heavy.
由於基礎設施建設是用來穩定經濟的一根重要槓桿，投資需求非常大。
Relying only on the official bond quota isn’t enough, she said.
僅靠官方債券發行額度是不夠的，她說。
