SDR意味着中國央行應提高透明度
An important milestone has been reached in global finance. For the first time, the currency of a developing country has joined the special drawing right (SDR) basket of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Chinese Renminbi has received this global recognition for the currency’s importance both in global trade and in cross-border financial transactions.
國際金融領域出現了一個重要的里程碑。一個發展中國家的貨幣加入了國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的特別提款權(SDR)貨幣籃子，這是有史以來頭一回。鑑於其在國際貿易和跨境金融交易中的重要地位，中國的人民幣獲得了這一全球認可。
This may herald the beginning of a fundamental shift in global finance that spells the end of hegemony by a small handful of advanced countries. Yet, it is in no one’s interest if the restructuring of the global financial architecture lowers the standards of the global financial system.
這或許預示着國際金融領域一個根本轉變的開始，預示着少數幾個發達國家的霸權的終結。不過，如果全球金融架構重組降低了全球金融體系的標準，那將是不符合任何人利益的。
Nowhere is this more important than on the issue of transparency. After all, what is the financial market but an efficient system for conveying information about the value of various assets. As the central bank for one of the most widely used currencies in the world and now a SDR currency, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) should no longer obscure so many elements of its own balance sheet.
在國際金融領域，透明度比在其他領域更重要。畢竟，金融市場歸根結底是一種傳遞各種資產價值信息的高效率系統。既然人民幣是世界上使用最廣的貨幣之一，現在又成了SDR籃子貨幣之一，中國央行(PBoC)不應再對其資產負債表的這麼多細節遮遮掩掩。
To begin, official Chinese data suggest that banks sold $272bn in foreign exchange to corporate and household customers from the beginning of August to the end of October. Typically, banks would satisfy customers’ demand for dollars by buying them from the foreign exchange reserve, thus leading to a roughly equivalent change in the reserve. Yet, the official foreign exchange reserve only declined by $125bn dollars in the same period. Given that the dollar was relatively flat in that period, it is difficult to reconcile the $150bn difference.
首先，中國官方數據似乎表明，從8月初至10月底，各銀行向企業和家庭客戶出售了2720億美元外匯。通常情況下，銀行在滿足客戶對美元的需求時，會向外匯儲備購買美元，從而導致外匯儲備發生大致等量的變動。然而，同期官方外匯儲備只減少了1250億美元。鑑於同期美元匯率相對穩定，1500億美元的差額很難解釋。
Market participants have made at least two educated guesses on what has made up the difference. First and foremost, perhaps the central bank did sell more dollars to banks on the spot market, but at the same time purchased dollar forwards from banks, which may allow the reserve to count the forward as liquid dollar assets. But when the forwards come due, the central bank would have to provide the dollars to banks and reveal losses to the reserve from earlier. Market participants are struggling to guess at the size and maturities of these spot-forward swaps.
市場參與者對這一差額做出了至少兩種有道理的推測。第一個是，中國央行可能確實在現貨市場向銀行出售了更多美元，但同時向銀行買入了遠期美元，這樣外匯儲備或許可以把遠期美元計爲流動美元資產。但遠期美元到期時，中國央行將不得不向銀行提供美元，並披露早先發生的儲備下降。市場參與者很難猜出此類現貨-遠期互換的規模和期限。
Also, were commercial banks ordered by the central banks to conduct these swaps with the PBOC? If so, the central bank should disclose the fact so that banks can disclose these administratively arranged swaps to their shareholders. Banks potentially bear large foreign exchange risks by having large net short dollar positions on their balance sheets. These risks may be attenuated if the counterparty is the central bank.
另外，商業銀行是否在央行命令下與央行進行這些互換？如果是這樣，中國央行應當披露這一事實，以便商業銀行可以向股東披露此類行政安排的互換。銀行如果在其資產負債表上持有大量美元淨做空頭寸，潛在就會承擔很大的外匯風險。如果交易對手方是央行，那麼這些風險或許就小一些。
Second, on the PBoC’s balance sheet, there is a mysterious category called “other foreign assets,” which dropped by some $85bn in August. Rumors have it that banks had provided required reserves to the central bank in dollars prior to August, which the central bank gave back to the banks in exchange for renminbi when outflows intensified in August. The central bank has not officially acknowledged whether this was the case. In addition, what else sits in this mysterious category, now still around $30bn?
第二個推測是，在中國央行的資產負債表上，存在一個名爲“其他外國資產”的神祕類別，8月份這個類別減少了約850億美元。有傳聞稱，8月之前，各銀行已向央行提供了要求的美元儲備，當8月份資本流出加劇時，央行把這些美元還給銀行，換回人民幣。中國央行尚未正式承認是否曾這麼做。此外，在這個如今規模仍達到約300億美元的神祕類別中，還有其他什麼資產呢？
Also when the China Securities Regulatory Commission announced on July 5th 2015 that the PBoC provided money to the China Securities Finance Corporation, the central bank did not provide any details on the amount and structure of those facilities.
另外，中國證監會(CSRC)在2015年7月5日宣佈中國央行向中國證券金融公司(China Securities Finance Corporation)提供了資金，而中國央行並未提供有關資金數量和此類安排結構的任何細節。
The data from the central bank suggests that in July, the central bank’s claims on non-bank financial institutions rose by Rmb200bn in July, but in June, PBoC’s “other assets,” another mysterious category, rose by Rmb274bn. Did the central bank spend Rmb200bn or nearly Rmb500bn to rescue the stock market in the summer?
中國央行的數據似乎表明，7月該行對非銀行金融機構的債權增加了2000億元人民幣，但在6月，中國央行的另一個神祕類別“其他資產”增加了2740億元人民幣。今年夏季，中國央行是否支出2000億元人民幣——或者近5000億元人民幣——去拯救股市？
Now that the renminbi is on its way to becoming a reserve currency, the global financial community has a right to know how much liquidity the PBoC provided to the market rescue effort, and whether there are plans to expand or reduce its provision of financing to the equity market.
既然人民幣即將成爲一種儲備貨幣，全球金融界有權利知道，中國央行提供了多少流動性用於救市，以及是否有計劃增加或減少它提供給股市的資金。
At the press conference after the renminbi joined the SDR basket, Yi Gang, a PBoC vice governor, pointed out that “joining the SDR also means that the global community will have many expectations for China in the financial and economic arenas.”
在人民幣加入SDR貨幣籃子之後的媒體吹風會上，中國央行副行長易綱指出，“加入SDR也意味着國際社會對中國在今後金融、經濟領域各個方面的許多期許。”
Indeed, the expectation is significantly higher today. A key expectation, and one where there is little quarter for debate, is for the market’s understanding of the central bank’s own balance sheet to be informed by facts rather than by guesses and rumors.
的確，這些期許現在顯著更高了。一個關鍵的、幾乎沒有分歧的期望是，市場能夠根據事實（而不是猜測和傳聞）理解中國央行自己的資產負債表。
