中國應力避全面信貸危機

China has embarked on an economic balancing act that is bound to appear counter-intuitive to many observers. Trying to trim the country’s ballooning debt burden without sacrificing rapid growth sounds akin to keeping a horse running fast while feeding it less hay. There is always a danger that the horse may stumble and fall, causing the earth to shake.

中國已開始實施的經濟平衡舉措，在很多人的眼中肯定是有違常理的。試圖在削減國內不斷膨脹的債務負擔的同時，又不犧牲快速的經濟增長，這聽起來就像是既要馬兒跑得快、又要馬兒少吃草。始終存在的一個危險是，這匹馬兒或將踉踉蹌蹌地跌倒，震動整個大地。

Any sign of flagging economic dynamism in China will therefore be met with concern. Every year, the Chinese economy adds more to global output than any other. As a result, a flurry of less than vibrant economic statistics raises an insistent question: is China’s credit squeeze finally morphing into a credit crunch?

所以，只要有跡象顯示中國經濟活力不足，都會引發人們的擔憂。中國經濟每年對全球產出增長的貢獻比其他任何國家都多。因此，一系列略顯頹勢的經濟統計數據提出了一個迫切需要回答的問題：中國的信貸緊縮終於要演變爲一場信貸危機了嗎？

Deflation, as measured by the producer price index (PPI), deepened to -4.6 per cent in April. Industrial profits fell 2.7 per cent in the first quarter and land sales, a key source of revenue for cash-strapped local governments, by almost a third year on year.

4月份，衡量通縮的生產者價格指數(PPI)同比下降了4.6%，降幅較之前有所加大。今年第一季度，工業利潤下降了2.7%，而賣地收入——資金短缺的地方政府的一項主要收入來源——同比下降了近三分之一。

The main concern is that falling industrial profits could render companies less able to service their huge debts, prompting them to call off or postpone investment plans and driving an upsurge in non-performing loans that would dissuade banks from lending. Indeed, fixed-asset investment growth is already declining significantly: falling to 12 per cent in the January to April period.

主要問題在於，工業利潤下滑可能致使企業償還鉅額債務的能力降低，促使它們取消或推遲投資計劃，並導致不良貸款激增、打擊銀行放貸興趣。事實上，固定資產投資增長已在大幅下滑：今年頭四個月裏已下降了12%。

Such strains are exacerbated by another factor. Although Beijing has loosened monetary policy three times over the past six months, real interest rates are rising sharply as deflation bites. They climbed to 10.8 per cent in March, their highest level since the financial crisis. Nominal average lending rates are lower, at 6.6 per cent, but still anomalously high in a world in which some $2tn in bonds trade at negative yields.

另一因素進一步加重了這些壓力。雖然過去6個月中國政府已經三次放鬆貨幣政策，但隨着通縮開始顯現出威力，實際利率正在大幅攀升。3月份，實際利率已升至10.8%，爲本次金融危機以來的最高水平。名義平均貸款利率相對較低，爲6.6%，但在世界上約2萬億美元債券的收益率爲負時，這一利率仍顯得高得出奇。

The impact of such a tight credit environment becomes clear when the size of China’s total corporate debt service burden is calculated. Given that non-financial total corporate debt is estimated by McKinsey to amount to $12.5tn, Chinese companies are paying on a nominal basis some $812bn in interest payments each year. In real terms, this amounts to $1.35tn. This is not only significantly more than China’s projected total industrial profits this year; it is slightly bigger than the size of a large emerging economy such as Mexico.

若將中國企業總償債負擔的規模考慮進來，這種緊縮信貸環境的影響就變得清晰起來。根據麥肯錫(McKinsey)估計，中國的非金融企業債總額爲12.5萬億美元，因此中國企業每年償付的名義債息約爲8120億美元。若按實際利率計算，債息則爲1.35萬億美元。這不僅遠遠大於今年中國工業利潤總額的預期值，而且還略大於墨西哥等大型新興經濟體的產出規模。

Beijing has several policy options at its disposal to keep a full-blown credit crunch at bay. Most analysts expect China to keep cutting interest rates while seeking to alleviate deflation by kick-starting infrastructure projects and invigorating the property sector. There are signs that such efforts are starting to bear fruit.

中國政府要想避免爆發全面信貸危機，有幾個政策選項可供選擇。多數分析師預計，中國將繼續降低利率，同時通過啓動基建項目和刺激房地產業來緩解通縮。有跡象表明，這些努力正開始奏效。

A more long-term approach involves relieving the debt mountains that have piled up on the books of local governments, which are the main agents of infrastructure investments. In March, the finance ministry said it would allow local governments to refinance Rmb1tn in off-balance-sheet debt as official government debt by selling bonds to state banks. Banks initially gave the plan a less than enthusiastic reception, but Beijing has reinforced its support by ordering that banks keep up lending to infrastructure projects that are ongoing.

更長遠的對策包括減少地方政府賬面上堆積的鉅額債務，地方政府是基礎設施投資的主體。3月份，中國財政部表示，將允許地方政府以向國有銀行發債的方式將1萬億元人民幣表外債務置換爲正式的政府債務。起初，銀行對這一計劃並不熱情，但北京方面以命令銀行繼續向進行當中的基建項目發放貸款的方式,強化了對該計劃的支持。

The situation that China faces is an unenviable one. But amid all the pressure, Beijing’s policy makers are adopting the right priorities. Forced to choose between deleveraging and maintaining a rapid clip of gross domestic product growth, they have opted for the latter. A credit crunch would risk an economic crisis from which it might take years to recover.

中國當前面臨的形勢是不值得羨慕的。但在衆壓之下，北京的政策制定者遵從了正確的政策優先次序。當不得不在去槓桿化與保持國內生產總值(GDP)快速增長之間做出選擇時，他們選擇了後者。信貸危機可能導致經濟危機，而一旦發生經濟危機，中國可能要花數年時間才能復甦。