18世紀阿姆斯特丹金融危機啓示錄
It was a confident, high-powered investment firm with credit lines at top financial institutions. It made big bets using borrowed money to buy assets and generate higher returns. But when the market for those assets went south, lenders demanded more collateral until the firm suddenly collapsed. Many frightened lenders clamped down on all borrowers, setting off an overall credit crunch.
它曾經是一家傲視業界、富可敵國的投資公司，能從世界一流的金融機構源源不斷地獲得貸款。它用借來的錢大把大把地押注,購買資產，獲得更高的回報。但當這些資產的市值下跌，貸款機構開始要求更多的抵押品，最後這家公司竟然轟然倒塌。很多驚魂未定的貸款機構全面收緊貸款要求，造成整體的信貸緊縮。The implosion of a giant subprime mortgage lender in 2007?The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008?
這裏說的是2007年倒閉的那家巨型次貸公司嗎?是2008年破產的雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)嗎？No. This crisis hit Amsterdam in 1772, after a respected Dutch investment syndicate made a disastrous bet on shares of the British East India Company.
都不是。1772年,一場空前的危機擊中了阿姆斯特丹：一家受人尊敬的荷蘭投資銀團對不列顛東印度公司(British East India Company)股票的投資變成了一場災難。
A new paper on the Dutch debacle, coauthored by Peter Koudijs at Stanford Graduate School of Business, turns up modern-day lessons about the not-so-scientific ways in which personal experience rather than market information can determine optimism, pessimism, and access to credit.
日前，斯坦福大學商學院(Stanford Graduate School of Business)教授彼得o庫迪斯基於這場荷蘭危機共同撰寫了一篇文章，圍繞“個人經驗（而非市場信息）決定樂觀、悲觀以及信貸的獲得與否”這種不那麼科學的方法給出了現代經驗。It’s no surprise that credit is “pro-cyclical.” When asset prices are booming, optimistic lenders tend to make more loans and often feed the euphoria. When markets sink, lenders rein in risk and sometimes make the downturn worse.
毫不奇怪，信貸具有“助週期性”。當資產價格一片繁榮時，樂觀的貸款機構傾向於發放更多貸款，進而加劇市場的狂歡。當資產價格下跌時，貸款機構會控制風險，有時這種做法會加速下跌。But what drives the underlying optimism or pessimism? Koudijs, working with Hans-Joachim Voth at the UniversitatPompeuFabra in Barcelona, found surprising answers.
但是，是什麼推動了樂觀或悲觀情緒呢？庫迪斯與巴塞羅那龐培法布拉大學(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)的漢斯-喬亞吉姆o沃斯發現了一些令人意外的答案。Though the Dutch financial markets then had none of today’s technology, they employed many of the same practices that traders use today. Investors bought securities, sometimes borrowing money with loans secured by the shares they were buying. In today's language, they bought shares on margin. Lenders protected themselves by demanding a “haircut” – collateral in cash or securities that exceeded the loan amount by a specified percentage. If the value of the securities dropped below that specified percentage, the lender would demand that the investor put up additional money to stay in line with the haircut. If the investor couldn’t come up with the added margin, the lender was entitled to liquidate the securities and recoup the loan amount.
當年的荷蘭金融市場固然沒有今天的任何科技，但他們的很多做法都和今天的交易員一樣。投資者們買入證券，有時會用買入的股票質押獲得貸款。用今天的話說，他們基於保證金買入股票。貸款機構爲了自身安全，會要求一個超出貸款金額一定百分比的“折幅”，質押現金或證券。如果證券價格下跌超過一定幅度，貸款機構會要求投資者交出更多資金，與“折幅”保持一致。如果投資者拿不出追加保證金，貸款機構有權將證券平倉，收回貸款額。The Amsterdam crisis began when a Dutch group known as the Seppenwolde syndicate made a big, contrarian bet on the shares of East India Company. Those shares had plunged in 1771 mainly because of losses in Bengal, but the company kept paying high dividends and covered up its shortfalls by borrowing money. Convinced that East India shares would quickly rebound, the Seppenwolde group aggressively bought them on margin. But instead of rebounding, the shares fell even further after the company slashed its dividend.
阿姆斯特丹危機始於荷蘭Seppenwolde銀團對東印度公司的股價做出了鉅額的反向下注。這隻股票在1771年早已大跌，主要是因爲孟加拉的損失。但這家公司靠借錢繼續支付高股息，掩蓋了問題。Seppenwolde深信東印度股價會很快反彈，基於保證金大舉買入該股。但它的股價並未反彈，在東印度公司降低了股息後，股價甚至進一步走低。To make a long story short, the Seppenwolde group went bankrupt shortly after Christmas of 1772. The disaster was a top story in Dutch newspapers. It ruined some of Amsterdam’s merchants and bankers. To prevent a general credit collapse, the city of Amsterdam stepped in temporarily as a lender of last resort. Sound familiar?
長話短說，1772年聖誕節後，Seppenwolde很快就破產了。這場災難是當時荷蘭報紙的頭條新聞。它徹底毀了阿姆斯特丹一批商人和銀行家。爲了防止出現全面的信貸崩潰，阿姆斯特丹市只能作爲最後貸款人暫時介入。這種情形是不是似曾相識？As it happened, the lenders to Seppenwolde never lost a guilder. Within weeks, they had liquidated all the East India shares and had recovered the money they had loaned.
事實上，貸款給Seppenwolde的那些機構一個荷蘭盾都沒損失。他們在幾周內就清空了全部的東印度股票，收回了所有貸款。But then the story took a strange turn. Koudijs and Voth found that Dutch lenders reacted to the Seppenwolde collapse in strikingly different ways. Those who had made loans to Seppenwolde but hadn’t actually lost money became far more pessimistic and demanded much bigger haircuts from all new borrowers. But those who had dodged the bullet by not lending to Seppenwolde didn’t tighten their requirements at all. In fact, those lenders slightly reduced haircuts to their borrowers – a sign they were at least as sanguine as before.
然後，事情峯迴路轉。庫迪斯和沃斯發現，荷蘭貸款機構對於Seppenwolde的倒閉做出的反應截然不同。那些曾經貸款給Seppenwolde、但一毛錢也沒損失的貸款機構變得越發悲觀，要求所有新借款人都提供更多的“折幅”。而那些從未貸款給Seppenwolde、因而躲過一劫的貸款機構則根本沒有提高要求。事實上，這些貸款機構可能還略略降低了對借款人的“折幅”要求，至少表明他們和過去一樣樂觀。Why the difference? It wasn’t because of a difference in the available information. As Koudijs and Voth point out, everybody in Dutch financial circles knew and understood the magnitude of what had happened. Nor was it because the Seppenwolde lenders had to rebuild their own finances. Within weeks of the default, the lenders knew they hadn’t lost any money.
爲什麼會有這樣的不同？原因並不是因爲雙方獲得的信息不同。正如庫迪斯和沃斯所指，荷蘭金融圈裏的每個人都知道和了解所發生事件的嚴重程度。也不是因爲Seppenwolde的貸款機構不得不重建自身財務。違約幾周後，貸款機構就知道他們沒有損失一毛錢。Yet, the disparity in haircuts lasted for almost two years. In fact, the pessimism and risk-aversion of the Seppenwolde lenders reduced the overall availability of leverage in Amsterdam.
但是折幅差異持續了整整兩年。事實上，Seppenwolde貸款機構的悲觀和避險情緒降低了阿姆斯特丹總體可用槓桿。In a rigorous analysis of Dutch financial records, Koudijs and Voth conclude that the only real difference between the pessimists and the optimists was whether they had gone through a harrowing personal experience. Koudijs compares it to the behavior of people who lived through the Great Depression, and who avoided financial risk for decades after trauma had passed.
庫迪斯和沃斯在孜孜不倦分析荷蘭金融記錄的過程中得出了結論，悲觀者和樂觀者之間真正的區別在於他們是否親身經歷過這樣的痛苦過程。庫迪斯認爲，可以類比的是那些經歷過大蕭條的人們的行爲：這些人在大蕭條夢魘過去後的幾十年裏，一直迴避金融風險。The Dutch case involved sophisticated financial professionals, people accustomed to analyzing financial and economic trends. Yet, they too focused on their personal experience.
荷蘭危機牽涉到成熟的金融專業人士，那些慣於分析金融和經濟趨勢的人們。但是，他們過於看重個人經驗。“It suggests that people put more weight on what happened to themselves and less weight on other information that might be available,”Koudijs says. The more personally removed people are from an important event, the less it is to affect their appetite for risk.
“它說明人們看重個人經驗，勝過其他可用信息，”庫迪斯表示。人們離一個重要事件的中心越遠，此事對他們的風險胃口影響就越小。It’s not clear which group of Dutch lenders was wrong. It’s possible that the Seppenwolde lenders ignored the evidence about broader financial conditions and were too pessimistic. It’s also possible that the other lenders were too casual in brushing off the implications of the East India mess. Either way, the Dutch episode suggests that even sophisticated investors become optimistic or pessimistic for myopic reasons.
不清楚到底是荷蘭哪一方貸款機構錯了。有可能Seppenwolde的貸款機構忽略了更大範圍內的金融狀況，過於悲觀。有可能另一方貸款機構在忽略東印度危機的衝擊意義時過於隨意。無論是哪一種情況，荷蘭危機都說明，即使是成熟的投資者也會因爲個人原因而變得樂觀或悲觀。To Koudijs, this has important regulatory implications for heading off 21st-century bubbles and busts.
庫迪斯認爲，這一點在預防21世紀的泡沫和破滅方面具有重要的監管意義。“If lenders are too optimistic during market booms and too pessimistic in downturns, that could be a good reason for authorities to set conservative capital requirements,” he suggests. “Higher haircuts might dampen the initial run-ups, but they could also dampen the subsequent fallouts when tides turn.”
“如果貸款機構在市場繁榮時過於樂觀，而在市場下行時過於悲觀，這或許是當局設定保守的資本金要求的一個最好理由，”他說。“加大折幅可能會抑制最初的漲幅，但當市場轉向，它們也能抑制隨後的跌幅。”
