當土耳其變得更像阿拉伯國家
After more than a decade in power, RecepTayyip Erdogan has come to tower over Turkey.
在掌權十多年後，雷傑普•塔伊普•埃爾多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)終於凌駕於土耳其之上。
The country has started to slip its westernmoorings.
土耳其開始脫離西方懷抱。
A republic shaped to be secular andwesternised is in some respects beginning to resemble its Arab neighbours.
當初以世俗化和西方化爲設計宗旨的一個共和國，在某些方面開始變得就像其阿拉伯鄰國。
Mr Erdogan, who five years ago, during theArab uprising, urged countries in the region to adopt secular constitutions,has now chosen identity politics —with sectarian trimmings.
在5年前的阿拉伯起義期間，埃爾多安曾敦促中東國家實行世俗憲法，現在他選擇了帶有宗派色彩的身份認同政治。
Polarisation has brought the presidentunparalleled electoral success.
觀點極化讓這位總統在選舉中獲得空前成功。
He has sharpened the Sunni, Islamist andTurkic identity of his Justice and Development party (AKP), and has worked tolock his opponents into separate blocs for the quasi-Shia Alevi and Kurdishminorities.
他在自己的正義與發展黨(Justice and Development party, AKP)中增強了遜尼派、伊斯蘭主義者和突厥人的勢力，並努力將對手限定在準什葉派的阿列維人和庫爾德人等少數羣體。
He has trampled on the rule of law and,after the shock of mid-July’s abortive coup, decreed emergency rule.
在今年7月中旬的未遂政變之後，他踐踏法治，頒佈了緊急法令。
Turkish officials can and do point out thatFrance —the European state the Turkish republic arguably has most copied —alsodeclared a state of emergency after last November’s jihadi assault onParis.
土耳其官員們可以（而且確實）指出，法國（可以說是土耳其共和國模仿最多的歐洲國家）在去年11月聖戰主義者襲擊巴黎之後也宣佈進入緊急狀態。
But the emerging reconfiguration of Turkey’s armedforces and security services may be heading towards models more familiar to theArabs and Iranians.
但土耳其武裝部隊和安全部門正在浮現的改組表明，它們正趨向阿拉伯和伊朗模式。
Mr Erdogan and his government wereprofoundly shaken by the plot, which they blame on followers of FethullahGulen, leader of a shadowy Islamist cult allied to the AKP for a decade butlocked in an escalating power struggle with its leaders for the past fiveyears.
埃爾多安及其政府因政變而遭受深遠衝擊——他們指稱是一個隱居的伊斯蘭主義團體領導人法士拉•葛蘭(Fethullah Gulen)的追隨者們發起了政變。這個團體曾與AKP結盟十年，但在過去5年與AKP領導人的權力鬥爭日益升級。
Almost half of Turkey’s generalshave been arrested or cashiered as Gulenist infiltrators since the coup, inpurges that have ensnared more than 100,000 people.
自政變以來，土耳其近半數將軍被視爲葛蘭分子而被捕或者革職，這場大清洗讓逾10萬人受到牽連。
Turks across the political spectrum areshocked not just at the violence of the mutineers, who killed 240 people, butalso because, as one liberal analyst puts it, It is very hard for us to graspthat our national army was in fact somebody else’s army.
不同政治見解的土耳其人都感到震驚，不僅僅是因爲導致240人喪生的暴亂活動，還因爲像一位自由派分析師所說的那樣，我們很難理解，我們國家的軍隊怎麼成了某個外人的軍隊。
Mr Erdogan, by contrast, emboldened bysurvival and sensing an opportunity, called the coup a gift from God enablinghim to cleanse the army.
相比之下，埃爾多安因倖免於難而變得大膽起來，並察覺到一個機遇，他將此次政變稱爲安拉賜予的禮物，讓自己能夠清洗軍隊。
Among Turkey’s neighbours, insecure rulershave developed a model whereby a well-armed national guard (in Saudi Arabia),republican guard (in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or Ba’athist Syria) or revolutionaryguard (in Iran) serve as a counterweight to the regular army and as praetoriansfor the regime.
在土耳其的鄰國當中，缺乏安全感的統治者發展出如下模式：成立全副武裝的國民衛隊（在沙特阿拉伯）、共和國衛隊（在薩達姆•侯賽因(Saddam Hussein)的伊拉克或者阿拉伯復興社會黨(Ba'athist)掌控的敘利亞）或者革命衛隊（在伊朗），將其作爲政權的御林軍，抗衡正規軍隊。
Given the extent of hostile penetration ofTurkey’s army, and the length of time it will take to replace the purgedcommanders with loyal cadres, some observers are wondering if Mr Erdogan is nowmoving towards a version of this praetorian model, based on the police.
鑑於土耳其軍隊遭到惡意滲透的程度，而且用自己人取代被清洗出去的將軍們需要花費很長時間，一些觀察家揣測，埃爾多安是否正以警察爲依託，組建某種版本的御林軍。
The police is becoming a paramilitary forcewhose first duty is to protect the regime, says one leading analyst.
一位領先分析師表示：警察正成爲一支首要職責爲保護政權的準軍事力量。
A western ambassador says: I think they’re verytempted to do it.
一位西方大使表示：我認爲他們渴望這麼做。
After all, what saved them was a police onsteroids and special forces; they know how close they came that night, sodefinitely they’re thinking of balancing off the army.
畢竟，救了他們的是就像嗑了藥的警察，還有特種部隊，他們知道那天晚上他們距離失去一切有多近，因此他們肯定想制衡軍隊。
Additional measures include moving theparamilitary gendarmerie from defence to the interior ministry, the dissolutionof the presidential guard and a widely anticipated purge of the nationalintelligence service.
其他措施包括將準軍事的憲兵隊由國防部改爲內政部管轄，解散總統衛隊，並如廣泛預期的那樣清洗國家情報部門。
Turkish officials say they are doing nomore than copying how, say, Italy manages its carabinieri or Spain its GuardiaCivil.
土耳其官員們表示，他們只不過是複製其他國家的做法，比如說意大利對其憲兵隊的管理，或者西班牙對其國民警衛隊的管理。
The answer to why the police are the heroesof July 15 [the date of the coup] is that there had already been a purge ofGulenists inside the police and police intelligence in the previous year and ahalf, says one.
一位官員稱：警方爲何成爲7月15日（政變日）的英雄的答案在於，在過去一年半里，警察和警方情報部門內部已經對葛蘭勢力進行了清洗。
There is no change in the model.
換句話說，模式沒有改變。
One commentator and former AKP supportersays: The police already have the upper hand in terms of trust —of societynot just of Erdogan.
一位曾經支持AKP的評論員表示：警方已經在取得社會信任（不只是埃爾多安的信任）方面佔據優勢。
Their greater prominence, including massivedeployments of thousands of officers in Ankara and Istanbul last month, istherefore natural.
因此他們的地位上升是自然的，包括上月在安卡拉和伊斯坦布爾投入數千警力。
So, too, some analysts argue, is a firmergovernment grip on the army, which is being gradually stripped of theprivileges and power that defined the military as a caste and once made it thefinal arbiter of political power.
一些分析師辯稱，政府加強對軍隊的控制也是自然的。如今軍隊正被逐步剝奪特權和權力，過去這些特權和權力讓軍隊成爲一個社會階層，一度讓其成爲政治權力的最終仲裁者。
This may all sound natural in the voice ofprofessional civil servants or AKP sympathisers.
如果這話從職業公務員或者同情AKP的人士嘴裏說出，聽上去可能非常自然。
But the voice we are more likely to behearing is Mr Erdogan’s.
但我們更可能聽到的是埃爾多安的聲音。
And the concentration of power around him,especially if it is going to acquire a permanent paramilitary layer, may notseem natural once the coup panic subsides.
一旦政變引起的恐慌消退，圍繞他集中的權力似乎就不會那麼自然了，尤其是如果這種集權將要獲得一層永久的準軍事力量的話。
