絲綢之路經濟帶能爲中亞帶來什麼

The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) builds on China’s long-standing economic investment in Central Asia, and it has the potential to further develop Central Asian economies. However, China’s historical track record of investment engagement in the region raises concerns that the SREB could instead exacerbate economic inequalities and poor governance.

建立在中國對中亞地區長期經濟投資基礎上的“絲綢之路經濟帶”(Silk Road Economic Belt)，有進一步推動中亞各國經濟發展的潛力。然而，中國參與該地區投資的歷史卻引發擔憂——絲綢之路經濟帶反而可能加劇這裏的經濟分化及治理不善。

China has long been a key driver of infrastructure investment and construction in Central Asia, covering a wide range of sectors. It has invested heavily in the region’s natural resource extraction, with gas, oil, uranium, gold and copper making up key exports from the region.

中國長期以來一直是中亞地區許多行業基礎設施投資和建設的關鍵動力。它大量投資於中亞地區的自然資源開採，使得天然氣、石油、鈾、黃金及銅成爲該地區的主要出口產品。

However,China has done far more than just invest in extractives. Chinese companies have built roads, railways, tunnels, power lines and refurbished oil refineries as well as special economic zones. It is also actively involved in agri-business and telecommunications investments.

然而，中國所做的遠不止於投資資源開採。中國企業在中亞修建了公路、鐵路、隧道、輸電線路，改造了煉油廠並建設了經濟特區。中國還積極參與當地農業企業及電信投資。

China’s economic strategy for Central Asia is linked to the domestic agenda for Xinjiang, the northwest frontier region that is home to a sizable Muslim ethnic minority population. This is based on the assumption that building up economic prosperity will result in political stability. For this theory to be truly tested, China needs to ensure the economic benefits cascade down to the general populations of Central Asia.

中國對中亞的經濟戰略與國內對新疆的規劃密切相關，地處中國西北邊境的新疆聚居着大量穆斯林少數民族人口。這項規劃基於的假設是，打造經濟繁榮將帶來政治穩定。要讓這一理論真正經受住考驗，中國需要確保經濟利益能夠向下惠及中亞地區的廣大民衆。

But so far the SREB initiative does not articulate how this trickle down effect is supposed to take place.

但到目前爲止，絲綢之路經濟帶倡議並未清楚地說明這種涓滴效應該如何實現。

For example, Chinese investment should in theory open up employment opportunities for the local populations. But there are limitations to this. Most often, a condition of the huge soft loans that China provides through state banks is that the linked projects are implemented by a Chinese company and workforce.

例如，理論上，中國的投資應該可以擴大當地居民的就業機會。但這方面受到了限制。很多時候，中國通過政策性銀行提供鉅額軟貸款的條件之一是，相關項目要由中國企業及中國勞動力來實施。

Although not a Chinese-specific funding method, it has contributed to some resentment amongst Central Asian populations against Chinese investment. Certain countries, such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have guarded against this with local content quotas. Turkmenistan technically requires that a project’s workforce consists of 70 per cent local employees, and Uzbekistan mandates that Chinese companies can only send management personnel, not labourers. In reality, there are lapses in adherence to such stipulations.

雖然這並非中國特有的融資方式，但這樣做已經引發了部分中亞民衆對中國投資的不滿。土庫曼斯坦、烏茲別克斯坦等國已經在利用“當地含量要求”抵制上述條件。在技術上，土庫曼斯坦要求一個項目70%的勞動力要來自當地，而烏茲別克斯坦要求中國企業只能委派管理人員，不能使用中國工人。但在現實中，並未嚴格遵照此類規定。

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there is a more visible Chinese workforce. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, the construction of two roads (Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam and Bishkek-Naryn-Torugart) part-funded by China consisted of 30 per cent local workers versus 70 per cent Chinese workers, with 60 per cent of raw materials imported. This highlights the often China-centric relationship that is quite typical on such infrastructure projects.

在吉爾吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦，可以看到更多的中國勞動力大軍。例如，在吉爾吉斯斯坦，在由中國提供部分資金的奧什-薩雷塔什-伊爾克什坦(Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam)公路、比什凱克-納倫-吐爾尕特(Bishkek-Naryn-Torugart)公路的建設中，當地工人佔了30%，中國工人佔了70%，其中60%的原材料爲進口。這凸顯出，這種通常以中國爲中心的國家關係在這些基礎設施項目中相當典型。

A lack of clarity in the terms of official lending to Central Asia may also increase economic vulnerabilities in the region, especially given the weight of Beijing’s loans in the national balance sheet. For instance, the Export-Import Bank of China was Kyrgyzstan’s largest creditor at the end of 2015, with outstanding credit worth almost $1.3bn out of a total $3.6bn in external debt.

中國提供給中亞的官方貸款的條款缺乏透明度，也可能加劇該地區的經濟脆弱性，特別是考慮到北京方面的貸款在接受貸款國家資產負債表中的比重。例如，2015年底，中國進出口銀行(Export-Import Bank of China)是吉爾吉斯斯坦最大的債權人，該國總外債36億美元，其中中國進出口銀行的貸款餘額近13億美元。

A representative at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Dushanbe noted that the organisation was encouraging Tajikistan to accept the loans, given the very low interest rate. Despite these good terms, in reality the loans are offered with quiet scepticism that they will ever be paid back. This is particularly true of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, given their heavier dependence on Chinese aid. A Wikileaks report from 2009 highlighted this scepticism, saying ‘no one in either the Chinese or Tajik governments is speaking about paying back Chinese loans’.

國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)駐杜尚別的一名代表指出，鑑於利率非常低，該組織鼓勵塔吉克斯坦接受這些貸款。儘管有這些優惠條件，實際上，這些貸款在發放的時候即隱含一個懷疑——它們最終是否能得到償還。對吉爾吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦而言尤其如此，因爲它們更爲依賴中國的援助。2009年曝光的一份維基解密(Wikileaks)報告突出了這種懷疑，該報告稱，“中國政府和塔吉克斯坦政府中都沒有人提及償還中國貸款之事”。

But the Chinese may seek loan repayments in other ways. Sometimes deals are structured so that access to resources or mineral rights become part of the repayment plan. However, there are suspicions of other, less transparent agreements, such as Tajikistan’s 2011 agreement to settle a land demarcation issue with China, in which the latter gained 1,000 sq km. This has been described as an ‘unofficial debt writing-off agreement’, although there is no documentary evidence of such deals. Mounting debt exposure within already structurally vulnerable economies could exacerbate domestic inequalities and potentially encourage unfair practices.

但中國或許會通過其他方式尋求收回貸款。有時，一些協議的簽署是爲了讓中方獲得資源或礦產權成爲還款計劃的一部分。然而，人們懷疑還有其他較不透明的協議。例如，2011年，塔吉克斯坦與中國達成了一項解決領土劃界問題的協議，中國從中獲得了1000平方公里土地。此舉被形容爲一項“非正式債務勾銷協議”，儘管沒有關於此類交易的書面證據。在這些經濟結構早已處於脆弱狀態的國家，不斷擴大的債務敞口或將加劇國內貧富分化，還可能鼓勵不公平競爭行爲。

In addition, there has been criticism of Chinese companies engaging in non-transparent operations in the region. Although far from the only foreign entity to be accused of opacity in Central Asia, a case involving Chinese state-owned oil and gas company CNPC is prominent.

此外，還有對中國企業在該地區參與非透明運作的批評。一起涉及中國國有油氣公司中國石油天然氣集團公司(CNPC)的事件引起巨大關注，雖然在中亞，該公司遠非被指責不透明的唯一外國實體。

In 2003 CNPC acquired a 25 per cent stake in Kazakhstan’s Aktobemunaigas, a Kazakh oil and gas company. There is documentary evidence to suggest that, through a complex set of business transactions involving a group of offshore entities, this sale involved a repurchase scheme of shares in Aktobemunaigas from a company controlled by a former business associate of the Kazakh president’s son-in-law. Questions surround opaque dealings through companies registered in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) in relation to the acquisition, but Kazakh authorities have banned reports on the topic. No action has been brought by Kazakhstan’s authorities against any party in the deal.

2003年，中國石油天然氣集團公司收購了一家名爲Aktobemunaigas的哈薩克斯坦石油天然氣公司25%的股份。有書面證據表明，通過涉及多家離岸實體的一系列複雜的商業交易，此番股權出售包含了一項股份回購計劃，從哈薩克斯坦總統女婿的前商業夥伴控制的一家公司回購Aktobemunaigas的股份。通過在英屬維爾京羣島(BVI)註冊的公司進行的、與此次收購相關的不透明交易引發質疑，但哈薩克斯坦政府已下令查禁該話題的報道。哈薩克斯坦當局並未對交易中的任何一方採取措施。

There have also been instances of opacity in infrastructure built by Chinese companies. The state-owned China Road and Bridge Corporation, funded through an Ex-Im Bank loan, upgraded the Dushanbe-Khujand-Chanak road in Tajikistan. In April 2010 the BVI-registered Innovative Road Solutions Ltd, a company with no apparent track record in such projects, implemented toll booths on this road as part of the government’s strategy to raise funds to repay the Chinese loan.

還有其他關於中國企業承建基礎設施不透明的事例。在中國進出口銀行貸款的資助下，國有的中國路橋公司(China Road and Bridge Corporation)在塔吉克斯坦承接了杜尚別-苦盞-恰諾克(Dushanbe-Khujand-Chanak)公路升級項目。2010年4月，在英屬維爾京羣島註冊的Innovative Road Solutions Ltd公司（一家沒有參與此類項目的明顯記錄的公司）在該公路上設立了收費站，作爲政府籌集資金、償還中國貸款的方案的一部分。

China’s SREB vision could be transformative for Central Asia. Investment is by no means altruistic, but China’s vision does in theory support an economic agenda that enhances prosperity for local populations. China has emphasised the importance of good governance through SREB initiatives such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

對中亞地區而言，中國絲綢之路經濟帶願景可能帶來變革。投資當然不可能是無私的，但中國的願景在理論上的確可以支持爲當地居民提升繁榮水平的經濟議程。中國一直強調通過絲綢之路經濟帶倡議——如亞洲基礎設施投資銀行(AIIB)——進行善治的重要性。

It also intends for the AIIB to partner more with development banks such as the Asian Development Bank, which will require adherence to an open tendering process that may address some of the issues of transparency. However, there are risks that if historical practices of bilateral engagement continue in Central Asia, the SREB initiative may be seen less than transformative for the local populations of Central Asia.

中國還計劃讓亞投行更多地與亞洲開發銀行(Asian Development Bank)等開發銀行進行合作，這將要求中國遵守公開招標流程，這樣或許可以解決部分透明度問題。然而，如果還跟以前一樣繼續進行雙邊交易，那對中亞地區的居民而言，絲綢之路經濟帶倡議可能不會帶來多大變革。