雙方對抗將使俄羅斯與西方雙輸

Western suspicions that Russia is following the “Crimea playbook” in eastern Ukraine are way off the mark. To begin with, President Vladimir Putin never considered Crimea to be part of Ukraine. His mission there, as he saw it, was to reunify Russia and correct two historical injustices: Nikita Khrushchev’s transfer of the peninsula to Ukraine from Russia in 1954; and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, which left Crimea in now independent Ukraine. That mission is now accomplished.

西方懷疑俄羅斯正在烏克蘭東部沿用“克里米亞策略”，這種懷疑遠不是事實。首先，俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)從來沒把克里米亞視爲烏克蘭的一部分。他認爲，他在該地區的使命是重新統一俄羅斯，並糾正兩個歷史性錯誤：一是1954年尼基塔•赫魯曉夫(Nikita Khrushchev)將克里米亞半島從俄羅斯劃歸烏克蘭，二是1991年蘇聯解體——這導致克里米亞留在如今獨立的烏克蘭手中。現在，他的這一使命已經完成。

Eastern and southern Ukraine are different. Ethnic Russians are not in a majority there, and the sense of allegiance and attachment to the Russian state – which was so strong in, say, Sevastopol – is totally missing. And whereas the Black Sea Fleet was on hand in Crimea, there are no Russian forces stationed in eastern Ukraine. To understand Mr Putin’s motives, you have to see the world through his eyes. For the Russian president, civilisations are the main units of global politics. Sometimes they align and sometimes they clash. For him, the Russian state is inextricably entwined with Russian civilisation. And he sees Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians as one people.

烏克蘭東部與南部不同。俄羅斯人在當地不佔多數，那裏完全沒有對俄羅斯政府的擁護感和歸屬感——而這種感覺在塞瓦斯托波爾之類的城市（塞瓦斯托波爾位於克里米亞，是俄羅斯黑海艦隊總部所在地——譯者注）是如此強烈。而且與黑海艦隊隨時駐紮在克里米亞不同，烏克蘭東部並未駐紮俄羅斯軍隊。要理解普京的動機，必須站在他的角度看待這個世界。對這位俄羅斯總統來說，文明纔是全球政治的主要單位。各種文明間有時候會結盟，有時候會發生衝突。對他來說，俄羅斯政府與俄羅斯文明之間有着密不可分的關係。此外，他還把俄羅斯人、白俄羅斯人和烏克蘭人視爲一家人。

A century ago, this was the official view in St Petersburg. For Mr Putin, the natural line between the Russian civilisation and that of western Europe runs along the western borders of Belarus and the Russian Federation itself. Ukraine, however, is a cleft country, torn between Russia and Europe. It can be partitioned or, better, neutralised – becoming either a buffer or a bridge between Russian and the west.

一個世紀以前，這正是聖彼得堡（沙皇俄國的首都——譯者注）的官方看法。對普京來說，俄羅斯文明與西歐文明間的天然界線，是白俄羅斯和俄羅斯聯邦的西部邊界組成的這條線。而烏克蘭卻是一個“裂縫國家”，俄羅斯文明和歐洲文明將該國分成了兩半。出於這個原因，烏克蘭可能呈現分裂狀態，或者更好的情況是該國會走向中立，成爲俄羅斯和西方之間的緩衝地帶或溝通橋樑。

The US sees the world through a similar lens. In its eyes, allowing Kiev to fall into Moscow’s orbit would mean a resurgence of the Russian empire. A western-leaning and economically successful Ukraine would deny Moscow its historical domain and undermine the Russian autocracy. The EU is not designed to think geopolitically but, in its quest for a zone of comfort in the east, it has pursued association agreements and supported the “Euromaidan” movement in Ukraine – both of which play into Washington’s hands. The EU’s obvious inability to manage the aftermath of Viktor Yanukovich’s ouster has put it in the back seat. Moscow and Washington are the players on centre court.

美國也在通過類似的透鏡看待整個世界。在美國眼中，坐視烏克蘭政府滑入俄羅斯政府的軌道，可能意味着俄羅斯帝國的復興。一個親西方並且在經濟上較爲成功的烏克蘭，會使俄羅斯無法恢復歷史上的版圖，並能削弱俄羅斯的獨裁政治。理論上說，歐盟(EU)並不會從地緣政治的角度考慮問題。不過，出於在其東部建立安全區域的要求，歐盟始終在尋求與烏克蘭簽署入盟協議，並始終支持烏克蘭的“親歐盟示威運動(Euromaidan)”。以上舉動都正中美國政府下懷。在維克多•亞努科維奇(Viktor Yanukovich)被罷免之後，歐盟顯然無法應對由此引發的一系列後果，這種無能爲力致使歐盟落到末席。於是俄羅斯和美國成爲舞臺中央的主角。

Until yesterday, when Kiev began a military operation in Ukraine’s east, the Kremlin neither needed nor intended to use military force there. Its army was lining up across the border to deter Kiev from using its own forces against pro-Russian activists, and to dissuade the US and Nato from meddling. A Russian intervention becomes more likely if there is a full-blown civil war.

直至週二，當烏克蘭政府開始在烏克蘭東部採取軍事行動時，克里姆林宮既沒有在該地區動武的必要，也沒有這種意願。俄羅斯軍隊在邊境集結，是爲了震懾烏克蘭政府，阻止它向親俄活動人士動用自身武力，並阻止美國和北約(Nato)的干涉。而一旦烏克蘭全面爆發內戰，俄羅斯採取干涉行爲的可能性就會變得更大。

The Kremlin is often accused of fomenting instability in Ukraine as a pretext for invasion. In reality, Russia’s main objective is to help the country’s Russophile southeast to assert itself and create a new political balance within Ukraine. It wants acceptance for official use of the Russian language where it is spoken; direct election of governors, which would create regional elites accountable to their Russian-speaking constituencies and form a counterweight to the pro-western elites in Kiev; continuing economic relations with Russia, especially in the defence industrial area; and, lastly, for Ukraine to maintain a neutral relationship with Nato.

人們經常指責俄羅斯政府，爲找到入侵藉口而煽動烏克蘭的不穩定局面。事實上，俄羅斯的主要目標是幫助烏克蘭親俄的東南部發出自己的聲音，並在烏克蘭內部創造新的政治平衡。俄羅斯希望烏克蘭接受目前講俄語的地區把俄語作爲官方語言；希望實現地方長官的直接選舉，這樣就能產生一批對講俄語的選民負責的地區上層人士，並形成對烏克蘭政府中親西方人士的制衡；希望烏克蘭能夠延續與俄羅斯的經濟往來，尤其是在國防工業領域；最後，俄羅斯還希望烏克蘭保持與北約間的中立關係。

Ukraine is a large and complex country. Ukrainians are not Russians, as Mr Putin will have to admit. They are not “one people”, even among themselves. But equally, not all those who reject a narrow version of Ukrainian nationalism are Russian agents.

烏克蘭是一個情況複雜的大國。普京將不得不承認的一點是，烏克蘭人不是俄羅斯人。烏克蘭人和俄羅斯人，即使是他們自己，也不認爲彼此是“一家人”。不過，與此同理，並非所有拒絕烏克蘭狹隘民族主義的人都是俄國間諜。

Moscow’s recent actions, from Crimea on, have released a historical paranoia in eastern Europe. Elsewhere, they have revived ideological clichés that date from the battle against Soviet communism, and helped fuel a still older fear that the west will for ever try to hold Russia down. Ukraine is a test.

自克里米亞事件以來，俄羅斯的種種舉動把東歐過去的妄想症又引發出來了。在其他地區，這些舉動更讓一些意識形態方面的陳詞濫調死灰復燃，它們可以上溯到與蘇維埃共產主義對抗的時期。此外，這些舉動還激起了一種歷史更久遠的恐懼感：西方將會永不停息地試圖壓制俄羅斯。而烏克蘭則是一次考驗。

If it is allowed to break up – or made to do so – Russia and the west will spin into a confrontation from which both will emerge the losers. Both sides need to keep Ukraine whole. They cannot allow a clash of civilisations to become a self-realising fantasy.

如果坐視烏克蘭分裂——或直接促成烏克蘭分裂，俄羅斯與西方將捲入一場對抗，雙方都會成爲輸家。因此，雙方都有必要保持烏克蘭的完整。他們不能任由一場文明之間的衝突演變成一種自我實現的幻想。