美國的富豪民粹主義

The first 100 days of Donald Trump’s presidency have brought some good news and some bad news. The good news is that, albeit chaotically, he is governing more as an orthodox post-Reagan Republican than most expected. The bad news is that he is governing more as an orthodox Republican than most expected. This now seems true in all the main policy areas, both domestic and international. It is clearly true in economic policy.

唐納德?特朗普(Donald Trump)就任總統的頭100天既帶來了一些好消息，也帶來一些壞消息。好消息是，儘管有些混亂，但他的執政方式比大多數人預想的更接近一名正統的后里根時代共和黨人。而壞消息是，他的執政方式比大多數人預期的更接近一名正統共和黨人。如今，在所有主要的政策領域——無論是國內還是國際，似乎都是如此。在經濟政策方面，顯然更是如此。

The idea of rebuilding US infrastructure has faded. The trade protectionism looks halfhearted. But deregulation is still an objective. So is tax reform, with the familiar combination of unfunded giveaways and magical thinking on deficits. Mr Trump’s policies look ever more like Reagan’s, but from a more unfavourable starting point.

重建美國基礎設施的想法已經消褪。貿易保護主義看起來意興闌珊。但放寬監管仍是目標之一。稅改也一樣，伴隨如下熟悉的組合：缺乏財力支撐的減稅大禮包和關於赤字的神奇想法。特朗普的政策看起來越發像里根的政策，只是起點更爲不利。

In announcing the tax plan, the White House did in an essential respect reinforce experience with this administration. It is hard to think of another government that would announce radical reforms of the tax system in a one-page document as sketchy as this one. It would be laughable if it were not so damaging to the US reputation for competent policymaking. The plan must be dead on arrival in Congress, in large part because it is not alive in the first place.

白宮在宣佈減稅計劃時，的確在一個重要方面加深了人們對於本屆政府的印象。很難想象會有另一屆政府如此粗略地在一頁紙的文件中宣佈對稅制進行徹底改革。要不是這種做法給美國強大政策制定能力的聲譽造成了嚴重損害，我們原本可能會覺得整件事挺可笑的。該計劃一到達國會必然流產，很大程度上是因其原本就是“死胎”。

The single page released by the White House last week does, however, contain very similar ideas to those announced by candidate Trump. This makes it possible for us to go back to the analysis published by the Tax Policy Center in October. While we have little reason to expect a plan just like this to be enacted, that earlier analysis does help us understand how far the administration’s starting point remains from common sense on fiscal policy.

然而，白宮上週發佈的一頁紙的稅改方案，的確包含了與特朗普競選總統時的口號非常相似的觀點。這使得我們可以回頭看看去年10月稅收政策中心(Tax Policy Center)發佈的分析。雖然我們幾乎沒有理由預期這樣一項計劃獲得通過，但早先的分析確實有助於我們理解，本屆政府的財政政策出發點在多大程度上背離了常識。

Start with the effects on the fiscal deficit. According to the TPC, the plan would raise the federal deficit (even after allowing for beneficial macro-economic effects) by a little under 3 per cent of gross domestic product for as long as it remains in place. But, according to the International Monetary Fund, the US is already running a general government structural deficit of 4 per cent of GDP, forecast to rise to just under 6 per cent of GDP in the early 2020s.

讓我們從該計劃對財政赤字的影響開始看。根據稅收政策中心的分析，該計劃在其實施的全部期間內，將使聯邦赤字與國內生產總值(GDP)之比(即使考慮到有利的宏觀經濟效果)升高略低於3%。但國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的數據顯示，美國政府總體結構性赤字與GDP之比本已達到4%，預計到本世紀20年代初將升至略低於6%。

With the addition of the proposed tax cuts, a structural general government deficit of well over 8 per cent of GDP might emerge in the 2020s. This would cause an explosive rise in debt. That could not be allowed to happen, particularly since US general government net debt is now more than 80 per cent of GDP, up from 45 per cent before the crisis and far lower when Reagan came to office. The structural deficit needs to be reduced, not increased. Yet this fiscal boost is not intended to be temporary and would also occur when unemployment is at 4.5 per cent of the labour force. It would be of the wrong kind, at the wrong time.

考慮到提議的減稅，到本世紀20年代，政府結構性總體赤字與GDP之比可能達到略低於9%。這將導致債務的爆炸性增長。不能允許這種情況發生，尤其是如今美國政府總淨債務與GDP之比已超過80%，高於金融危機前的45%，但遠低於里根(Reagan)上臺時的水平。結構性赤字需要削減，而非增加。然而按計劃，這種財政刺激不是暫時的，即便失業率爲4.5%（自然失業率）時，也將施行。這將是在錯誤時間的一種錯誤做法。

Defenders suggest, in response, that the plan might pay for itself, via increased activity. Given the low unemployment rate, this seems quite unlikely. Yet US Treasury secretary Steven Mnuchin has even suggested that, in combination with other administration policies, tax cuts could raise US trend growth to 3 per cent, from the current trend of slightly below 2 per cent.

辯護者回應稱，該計劃或許可以通過經濟活躍度提高來自行買單。由於失業率較低，這似乎極度不可能。但美國財政部長史蒂文?姆努欽(Steven Mnuchin)甚至表示，結合華府的其他政策，減稅可將美國的趨勢增長率從當前的略低於2%提升至3%。

Such a rise in growth would help. But it is very unlikely, for reasons explained by Jason Furman, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. For it to happen, he argues, it would be far from sufficient for the decline in labour force participation to reverse. There would also be a need for a rise in the growth of output per hour from the 1.2 per cent achieved in the last decade to 2.8 per cent. That rate of productivity growth has been extremely rare in the past, over any extended time period. It would be mad for policymakers simply to assume this will happen (See charts.)

這樣的經濟增長率提升會有所幫助。但這種情況出現的可能性非常低，原因如白宮經濟顧問委員會(Council of Economic Advisers)主席賈森?弗曼(Jason Furman)所解釋的。他認爲，勞動力參與率的下降趨勢發生逆轉，遠不足以讓這種情況發生。還需要每小時產量增長率從過去十年實現的1.2%提高至2.8%。在歷史上，我們很少見到這種生產率增長速度能持續哪怕一小段時間。決策者準是瘋了，纔會就這麼簡單地假設這種情況會發生（見圖表）。

The question then is whether these huge tax cuts could be offset elsewhere. The border tax adjustment to corporation tax now seems to be a dead idea. So the only solution would be huge cuts in spending. To reduce spending by, say, 2.5 per cent of GDP would mean a cut in federal spending of about 12 per cent. But nearly 90 per cent of that spending goes on defence, health, income security, veterans’ benefits, social security and interest. On the assumption that these items will be protected, every other item of federal spending would have to be eliminated. The federal government would, in many areas, vanish.

那麼，剩下的問題就是，這些大幅度的減稅能否在其他領域得到抵償。對公司稅的邊境稅調節，現在看來已經沒戲了。因此唯一的解決方案將是大幅削減支出。支出削減幅度達到GDP的2.5%（打個比方），將意味着聯邦支出削減約12%。但將近90%的聯邦支出都用於國防、醫療、收入保障、退伍軍人福利、社會保障和利益。假設這些支出項目都不動，其他所有的聯邦支出項目都將不得不取消。聯邦政府在很多領域的作用將消失。

The tax proposals also look astoundingly regressive. According to the TPC’s analysis, the top 0.1 of the income distribution might receive an average tax cut approaching 14.2 per cent of after-tax income, while middle-income households would receive an average tax cut of 1.8 per cent. Among the startlingly regressive changes would be repeal of the alternative minimum tax, repeal of estate taxes and huge reductions in corporate tax rates, including on so-called pass-through businesses. To those that have it shall be given. That is the doctrine of Mr Trump. It is also the old Republican trickle-down doctrine in purest form.

稅改提議的累退性看起來也令人吃驚。根據稅收政策中心的分析，處於收入分配最頂層的0.1%的人平均享受的減稅幅度，可能接近稅後收入的14.2%，而中等收入家庭平均享受1.8%的減稅。除各項累退程度令人吃驚的改變之外，提議還包括廢除替代性最低稅(AMT)、廢除遺產稅以及大幅削減公司稅率（包括對所謂“過渡法人企業”(pass-through business)的減稅）。凡有的，還要加給他。這是特朗普的教義。這也是最純粹的老共和黨“涓流”(trickle-down)式教義。

Mr Trump won the nomination by promising to be a different sort of Republican. He is not. What he has achieved is to make the “bait and switch” yet more obvious. Post-Reagan Republicans reached out to the base by campaigning on cultural issues, while legislating for the upper 1 per cent. That is “pluto-populism”. Mr Trump added infrastructure spending, trade protectionism and support for Medicare and social security. But he too plans to deliver for the top 1 per cent.

特朗普通過發誓做不一樣的共和黨人而贏得提名。但他不是。他能有今天的位置，將把“先許諾、再掉包”那一套更加直白地展露在世人面前。后里根時代的共和黨人通過把競選重心放在文化問題上觸及基層民衆，同時在立法時偏向最富有的1%的人。這是“富豪民粹主義”。特朗普提出瞭如下新鮮元素：增加基礎設施支出、倡導貿易保護主義、支持聯邦醫療保險（Medicare，面向老年人的聯邦健康保險）和社會保障。但他同樣也打算爲最富有的1%的人帶來好處。

Pluto-populism is highly politically effective. But it works by making the base ever angrier and more desperate. That is playing with political fire. The republic may survive Mr Trump. But what comes after?

“富豪民粹主義”在政治上非常行之有效。但它行之有效的方式，是讓基層民衆越來越憤怒和絕望。這是在政治上玩火。一個特朗普可能不會讓美利堅合衆國倒下。但接下來會有什麼？