歐洲之父丘吉爾和被誤讀的英歐關係
Exactly 70 years ago, on September 19, 1946, Sir Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech in Zurich calling for the creation of a United States of Europe.
整70年前的1946年9月19日（原文發表於9月19日——譯者注），溫斯頓•丘吉爾爵士(Sir Winston Churchill)在蘇黎世發表了一篇著名演說，呼籲建立歐羅巴合衆國。
Britain’s wartime leader was revered across the continent for his role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, despite the fact that he had lost office as UK prime minister after the general election of 1945.
儘管丘吉爾在1945年的大選中丟掉了首相之位，但這位英國的戰時領袖因其在擊敗納粹德國過程中發揮的作用贏得了歐洲各地民衆的尊敬。
His ringing call for reconciliation between France and Germany, and the re-creation of the European family, struck a chord for both the victors and the vanquished emerging from the devastation of two world wars.
他對法德兩國和解以及再造歐洲大家庭的大聲疾呼，在從兩次世界大戰的浩劫中走出來的戰勝國和戰敗國之間都引發了共鳴。
It inspired a European movement that led to the creation of the Common Market, and, ultimately, to today’s European Union.
丘吉爾的呼籲激發了一場歐洲一體化運動，促成了歐洲共同市場(Common Market)的建立，並最終形成了今天的歐盟(EU)。
Churchill was called the father of ‘Europe’, and he said much to justify that label, the British journalist and political commentator Hugo Young wrote in his seminal history of Britain and Europe. But he was also the father of misunderstandings about Britain’s part in this Europe.
丘吉爾被稱爲‘歐洲’之父，他當之無愧，英國記者、政論家雨果•揚(Hugo Young)在其關於英國與歐洲歷史的影響深遠的著作中寫道，但他也是英國在新歐洲所扮演角色被誤解的始作俑者。
He encouraged Europe to misunderstand Britain, and Britain to misunderstand herself.
他助長了歐洲對英國的誤解以及英國對自身的誤解。
As Churchill urged a Franco-German partnership to lead his vision of a new Europe, he declared that Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, along with the US and USSR, should be friends and sponsors of the project.
雖然丘吉爾力勸法德建立夥伴關係、帶領歐洲向他設想的新歐洲邁進，他卻宣稱，英國、英聯邦應同美國、蘇聯一道，成爲該計劃的支持者和贊助者。
He did not talk of the UK becoming a member itself.
他並未談到英國自身應成爲新歐洲的一員。
We are with Europe, but not of it, he wrote in an earlier essay. We are linked but not comprised.
我們與歐洲在一起，但並非其中一員，他在早前的一篇文章中寫道，我們彼此關聯，但並無隸屬關係。
That ambiguity has haunted Britain’s relationship with its continental neighbours ever since, culminating in the UK referendum vote on June 23 for Brexit.
自那時起，這種含糊不明一直困擾着英國與其歐陸鄰國的關係，直到今年6月23日英國公投表決退出歐盟時達到頂點。
First the UK refused to join in 1957, dismissing the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome as irrelevant.
起先，英國在1957年拒絕加入歐洲經濟共同體，並將羅馬條約(Treaty of Rome)的談判斥爲無足輕重。
Then, when Harold Macmillan changed his mind, for fear of being left out of an economic success story, his membership bid was vetoed by France’s president Charles de Gaulle.
後來，當哈羅德•麥克米倫(Harold Macmillan)因擔心英國錯失一個經濟增長機會而改變主意申請加入時，他的申請卻被法國總統夏爾•戴高樂(Charles de Gaulle)否決。
When Edward Heath finally succeeded in negotiating membership from 1973, it was seen by many as a defeat for UK exceptionalism, not a victory for European solidarity.
當1973年愛德華•希思(Edward Heath)最終成功地通過談判讓英國加入歐共體時，許多人將之視爲英國例外主義的失敗，而非歐洲一體化的勝利。
That British attitude is rooted in its imperial history — Churchill’s great passion — and a perception of British security, its interests and its diplomacy, as global, not narrowly European.
英國人對歐洲的這種態度根植於大英帝國的歷史——丘吉爾的一大愛好——以及這樣一種觀念，即英國的安全、利益和外交都繫於全球、而非僅繫於歐洲。
That feeling, along with resentment at the apparent roles of Germany and France in setting the European agenda, was a constant subtext to arguments in favour of Brexit.
這種感覺（以及對德法兩國在設置歐洲議程方面明顯作用的不滿）一直以來是暗含在主張退歐理由中的潛臺詞。
Yet, in spite of the centrality of strategic concerns to the intellectual UK debate on Europe, the subjects of foreign policy and security received scant attention during the referendum campaign.
然而，儘管外交政策和安全議題在英國知識界關於去留歐盟的辯論中處於戰略關切的中心，但這兩個議題在此次公投運動中幾乎沒有受到關注。
It was dominated instead by the debates on immigration and the economy.
反而是圍繞移民和經濟的辯論佔了主導。
When foreign, security and defence policy was discussed . . . it was predominantly in terms of the costs and benefits to the UK of being a member of the EU, says Richard Whitman, professor of politics and international relations at the University of Kent.
在討論外交、安全和防務政策時……主要談論的是英國作爲歐盟成員國的成本和收益，肯特大學(University of Kent)政治與國際關係教授理查德•惠特曼(Richard Whitman)說，
There was no substantive rehearsal of what the future EU-UK foreign and security policy relationship might be with the UK outside the EU.
關於英國退歐後歐盟與英國外交及安全政策關係可能會有怎樣的未來，根本沒有切實的預演。
It was a curious and alarming omission, given that such questions have always been at the heart of British historic hesitation about the EU.
這是一個蹊蹺且令人擔憂的遺漏，因爲這些問題一直都處於英國對歐盟猶豫不決歷史的中心。
For Churchill, as for the overwhelming majority of the British establishment in those early postwar decades, the British empire (and the Commonwealth that succeeded it) and the special relationship with the US, were the nation’s two most important strategic priorities.
對丘吉爾以及戰後初期幾十年英國絕大多數建制派而言，大英帝國（及後來的英聯邦）與英美特殊關係是英國最重要的兩個戰略重點。
Nato was seen in London as much the most important alliance in Europe.
倫敦方面將北約視爲歐洲可以說最重要的聯盟。
The Common Market, launched in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, was seen as largely irrelevant to national security.
根據1957年《羅馬條約》建立的歐洲共同市場基本上被視爲對國家安全無關緊要。
In the Brexit camp, the idea of reviving an Anglosphere centred on the special relationship between London and Washington (especially in intelligence co-operation), and underpinned by close ties with the old Commonwealth of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, was very popular.
在退歐陣營，復興盎格魯文化圈(Anglosphere)的想法非常流行，盎格魯文化圈以英美特殊關係（尤其是情報合作）爲中心，以與澳大利亞、加拿大、新西蘭幾個老英聯邦國家的緊密聯繫爲支撐。
The question now is whether that romantic attachment to old imperial and English-speaking ties can be turned into an effective policy.
現在的問題是，這種對昔日帝國和英語圈聯繫的不切實際的依戀，能否轉化爲有效的政策。
The world in 2016 is very different from that of 1946.
2016年的世界已經與1946年的世界截然不同了。
The number one problem is that everyone else has moved on, says Prof Whitman. They have been pretty successful at forging ‘post-British’ foreign policy identities.
首要問題在於，所有其他國家都已經向前看了，惠特曼教授說，在塑造‘後英國’外交政策認同方面，他們一直非常成功。
Australia and New Zealand have refocused their foreign and security policy on the Asia-Pacific region, in which China is the dominant player.
澳大利亞、新西蘭已將本國的外交和安全政策重心重新調整到亞太地區，而這一地區的主導者是中國。
Canada has defined itself as an independent-minded US neighbour with increasingly strong Asia links to balance its traditional European ties.
加拿大已將自身定義爲美國的獨立自主的鄰居，並利用與亞洲日益強有力的聯繫來平衡與歐洲的傳統關係。
As for the US, successive regimes have made it clear that they see European integration as an essential part of western security policy and they have made no secret of wanting the UK to be a full-hearted player.
至於美國，歷屆政府都明確表示，他們將歐洲一體化視爲西方安全政策的重要組成部分，並毫不掩飾地表示希望英國全心全意地促進歐洲一體化。
Opinion in Washington was overwhelmingly opposed to the idea of Brexit during the referendum campaign, with the exception of Donald Trump, the Republican presidential candidate.
此次公投運動期間，除了共和黨總統候選人唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)之外，反對英國退出歐盟的意見在華盛頓佔壓倒性多數。
Leading members of the Brexit camp, such as David Davis, now the minister responsible for the exit negotiations, and Liam Fox, minister for international trade, have always based their arguments on the irrelevance of the EU to UK security, and the far greater importance of Nato.
退歐陣營主要成員——如現在負責退歐談判的大臣戴維•戴維斯(David Davis)、國際貿易大臣利亞姆•福克斯(Liam Fox)——一直將歐盟對英國的安全無關緊要、北約要重要得多作爲自己的立論基礎。
The expectation now is that the UK will throw itself with redoubled enthusiasm into beefing up the Nato alliance, to make up for its gradual withdrawal from the EU.
現在的預期是，英國將以加倍的熱情投入增強北約聯盟力量的努力中，以補償其逐步退出歐盟的不利影響。
That could mean bolstering the UK military support for the Baltic republics, however much such a move might infuriate Moscow.
這可能意味着加強英國對波羅的海國家的軍事支持——無論此舉可能會多大地激怒俄羅斯。
For the rest of the EU, the prospect of UK withdrawal is a mixed blessing.
對歐盟其他成員國而言，英國退歐帶來的前景可謂喜憂參半。
On the one hand, the most serious and rapidly deployable military forces in the EU are those of Britain and France.
一方面，歐盟最重要及部署最快速的軍事力量就是英軍和法軍。
The UK has played a leading role in the anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia.
在打擊索馬里附近海域海盜的行動中，英國發揮了領導作用。
British diplomats have also played an important role in establishing the European External Action Service — the EU’s own diplomatic arm.
英國外交官在建立歐盟自身的外交機構——歐盟對外行動署(European External Action Service)方面也發揮了重要的作用。
On the other hand, the UK has been increasingly hostile to the development of an EU defence policy, and to any weakening of intergovernmental control (and therefore a national veto) of security policy.
另一方面，英國越來越反對發展歐盟防務政策，反對以任何形式削弱對安全政策的政府間控制權（因而也反對削弱國家否決權）。
British departure from the EU would free the other member states to move forward with the creation of a stronger military operational and planning core, as favoured by France, and more support for a stronger European defence industry.
英國退歐將使得其他成員國能夠自由地推進創建一個更強大的軍事行動和規劃核心（如法國所青睞的），增加對更強大的歐洲國防工業的支持。
In the three months since the referendum vote, there has been no indication from Boris Johnson, the new foreign secretary, or prime minister Theresa May as to how they see the future focus of foreign and security policy.
進行公投後的三個月裏，新任外交大臣鮑里斯•約翰遜(Boris Johnson)和新任首相特里薩•梅(Theresa May)都未說明他們對英國外交和安全政策未來的工作重點有何看法。
The truth is that the process of negotiating Brexit, and reorganising the UK-EU relationship for the future, is likely to dominate everything else on the British government’s agenda for years to come.
事實是，英國退歐的談判進程以及重新定義英國與歐盟未來關係這兩件事，可能將在未來多年主導英國政府的所有議程。
The UK’s key foreign policy priority for the foreseeable future will be sorting out its relationship with the EU, says Prof Whitman. We will have to devote far more energy and effort to the EU than to the wider world.
在可預見的未來，英國主要的外交政策重點將是理順其與歐盟的關係，惠特曼教授說，我們將不得不對歐盟投入比對世界其他地區多得多的精力和努力。
We will need more EU experts than ever before.
我們將需要比以往任何時候都更多的歐盟專家。
That is the irony of the Brexit decision.
這正是英國退歐決定的可笑之處。
At least for the foreseeable future, it will mean a lot more EU, rather than less, on the UK government agenda.
至少在可預見的未來，這意味着英國政府的議程將更多、而非更少地考慮歐盟。
