硬退歐會給英國帶來什麼命運
Politicians propose; markets dispose.
政治家提出計劃；市場決定結果。
Last week began with a statement by Theresa May, the UK prime minister, of her plans for Brexit.
上週初，英國首相特里薩•梅(Theresa May)發表了一份聲明，闡述她的退歐計劃。
The foreign currency markets responded by writing down the value of UK assets.
外匯市場對此做出的反應，是使英國資產貶值。
The UK is determined to take back control of its fate.
英國決定拿回自身命運的控制權。
But formal sovereignty is not power.
但正式主權並非決定力量。
The UK government announces its intentions.
英國政府宣佈了自己的計劃。
The reaction of others determines results.
決定結果的是其他方面的反應。
The two speeches made by Mrs May at the party conference last week make a hard Brexit by far the most probable outcome.
從梅在上週保守黨大會上發表的兩次演講來看，硬退歐(hard Brexit)顯然是可能性最大的結果。
That is so for both procedural and substantive reasons.
這既有程序上的原因，也有實質性原因。
The procedural reason is that she has decided to trigger the EU’s Article 50 exit procedure by no later than March next year.
程序上的原因是，她已決定，英國觸發《里斯本條約》第50條、從而啓動退出歐盟程序的時間將不晚於明年3月。
This would give the initiative to the other members and focus the negotiations on a divorce, to be finalised within just two years.
這將把主動權交給其他成員國，把談判的焦點完全放在與歐盟分道揚鑣上，並且要在短短兩年內完成談判。
Given the complexity of EU decision-making, this is too short for negotiating a bespoke deal.
考慮到歐盟決策過程的複雜性，要磋商一項量身打造的專門協議，這點時間太短。
The substantive reason why a hard Brexit is overwhelmingly likely is that the prime minister has also ruled out all but such a bespoke deal.
硬退歐可能性非常大的實質原因是，除了談判這樣一項專門協議，梅排除了其他所有可能性。
In her words, We are going to be a fully independent, sovereign country, a country that is no longer part of a political union with supranational institutions that can override national parliaments and courts . . . So it is not going to a ‘Norway model’. It’s not going to be a ‘Switzerland model’. It is going to be an agreement between an independent, sovereign United Kingdom and the EU.
用她的話來說，我們即將成爲一個完全獨立的主權國家，不再是一個擁有凌駕於國家議會和法庭的超國家制度的政治聯盟的一部分……因此，結果既不會是‘挪威模式’，也不會是‘瑞士模式’，而是一個獨立自主的聯合王國與歐盟之間的協議。
The procedure and goal she has outlined would in practice put the country on a timetable to exit not just from the EU, but from the preferential terms of access to EU markets on which investors, both foreign and domestic, rely.
她概述的程序和目標實際上爲英國啓動了一份時間表，英國不僅將脫離歐盟，還將退出歐盟市場特惠准入條款——這些條款是國內外投資者所看重的。
This would be a hard Brexit.
這將是一場硬退歐。
Furthermore, UK trade negotiators simply could not negotiate offsetting agreements with the rest of the world.
另外，英國的貿易談判代表們根本無法與全球其他地區談判補償性的協議。
This is partly because no such possibility plausibly exists, since the EU takes almost half the UK’s exports.
部分原因是，這種可能性十之八九是不存在的，因爲歐盟市場佔到英國出口的近一半。
It is also because the UK will not be deemed a credible negotiating partner until its EU deal is finalised.
還有一個原因是，在英國與歐盟敲定協議之前，其他地區不會把英國視作可信的談判夥伴。
By March 2019, then, the UK is likely to find itself without preferential access to any markets.
到2019年3月，英國可能發現自己享受不到任何一個市場的特惠准入待遇。
Yet this is far from all.
然而，這遠非全部。
Mrs May also stated that if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere.
梅還聲稱，如果你認爲自己是一位世界公民，那麼你就不會是任何一個國家的公民。
She denied the possibility that one might be both a citizen of the world and a citizen of somewhere.
她否認一個人既是世界公民又是某個國家公民的可能性。
But many of the skilled foreigners on whom the UK depends view themselves as just that.
但英國所依賴的很多具備專業技能的外國人就把自己視爲這種公民。
Why should they wish to stay in a country whose prime minister appears to despise them? Xenophobia was also an important part of the Brexit campaign, whatever Brexiters claim.
他們爲什麼要留在一個其首相似乎輕視他們的國家呢？不管退歐支持者們怎麼說，排外心理也是退歐運動中的一個重要元素。
Does anybody believe such language has no effect on potential workers and investors or, not least, our EU partners?
有人認爲梅的這番言論不會對潛在的員工和投資者還有我們在歐盟的夥伴們造成影響嗎？
Unwise words have consequences.
不明智的言論會造成後果。
The UK government’s extreme goals are now clear.
英國政府的極端目標現在已明確無誤。
Investors have duly marked down the value of the country’s assets in the simplest way, by selling the pound.
投資者們採取了恰當的做法，用最簡單的方式，也就是拋售英鎊，降低了英國資產的價值。
The real effective exchange rate is close to where it was in late 2008, immediately after the financial crisis.
目前英鎊的實際有效匯率接近2008年底金融危機爆發後的水平。
In dollar terms, stock market indices are lower than before the referendum and also relative to other markets.
以美元計算，英國股指低於退歐公投之前的水平，也遜於其他市場。
Such a devaluation of UK assets was inevitable.
英國資產的此番貶值是不可避免的。
It reflects investors’ correct belief that its economic prospects have worsened.
它反映了投資者所抱持的正確觀點，即英國的經濟前景已經惡化。
But its poor past export performance suggests that the depreciation is still not big enough to generate the needed shift in the structure of the economy towards production of tradeable goods and services.
但英國過往糟糕的出口表現表明，此番貶值仍不足以帶來經濟結構的必要轉型，使生產轉向可貿易的商品和服務。
Moreover, it is quite likely that today’s huge current account deficits will be unsustainable post-Brexit.
此外，在英國退歐後，當前龐大的經常賬戶赤字很有可能將無法維持。
If so, the UK will need a big decline in aggregate spending relative to incomes.
如果是這樣的話，相對於收入，英國將需要大幅降低總支出。
The depreciation alone is most unlikely to deliver that.
而僅靠資產貶值不大可能實現這一點。
Macroeconomic policy might also need to be tighter.
宏觀經濟政策或許也需要收緊。
But such a tightening is precisely what the Bank of England and the new Treasury team wish desperately to avoid.
但緊縮正是英國央行(Bank of England)及新的財政部班子極力想要避免的。
True, the inflows of capital needed to finance the UK's huge external deficit might continue, supported by the perception that the land of the depreciated pound had at last become a bargain.
爲英國鉅額外部赤字提供資金所需的資本流入的確有可能會持續，因爲外界會認爲英鎊貶值後，至少英國地產變得便宜。
But suppose the inflows ceased, instead, as investors became ever more nervous about the path the government had chosen.
但假設資本停止流入——在投資者對英國政府所選擇的道路越來越感到不安的情況下，這是有可能的。
Then the currency might collapse.
那麼英鎊或許會崩盤。
Yields on gilts might also jump.
英國國債的收益率可能也會飆升。
Policymakers could face a predicament familiar to emerging economies that lose the confidence of investors: the need to raise interest rates and close fiscal deficits during a crisis.
類似於讓投資者喪失了信心的新興經濟體，政策制定者將面臨這樣的困境：在危機期間需要加息並填補財政赤字。
Is this likely? No.
這可能做到嗎？不可能。
Is the government’s loose talk making it rather more likely? Yes.
英國政府失之嚴謹的講話是否增加了出現這種局面的可能性？是的。
The government would then learn the limits of sovereignty in an open economy.
到那時，英國政府將會認識到開放型經濟中主權的極限。
The views of Philip Hammond, chancellor of the exchequer, who reminded his party last week that the British people did not vote on June 23 to become poorer, or less secure, might then count for more, and those of the Brexiters in the cabinet for less.
財政大臣菲利普•哈蒙德(Philip Hammond)上週提醒他所在的保守黨，英國人民在6月23日的投票不是爲了變得更貧窮，或更不安全。他的觀點將變得更加重要，而內閣中那些退歐派的觀點將不會有多大用處。
In a crisis, the unthinkable becomes thinkable.
在危機中，不可想象的事情也會變成可能。
Triggering Article 50 without parliamentary approval might be impossible.
但在未經議會批准的情況下觸發第50條或許是不可能的。
It surely ought to be impossible.
理應如此。
By a thin margin the country voted for some kind of Brexit.
支持以某種方式退歐的人數只佔微弱優勢。
But the government has no mandate for the rather extreme version it is choosing.
但是政府目前選擇的這種相當極端的退歐方式並未獲得授權。
Moreover, Brexiters insist that their goal is to restore parliamentary sovereignty.
此外，退歐派堅稱他們的目標是恢復議會主權。
Why then does the government plan to ignore parliament when these decisions are taken?
那爲什麼政府做這些決策時卻打算忽略議會呢？
What drove Leavers was, we are also told, the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK.
退歐派還說，他們秉持的是與英國有關的決策應在英國作出的原則。
The currency markets demonstrate the emptiness of that principle.
但外匯市場證明了這一原則毫無實質意義。
Britain’s EU partners are about to do the same.
英國的歐盟夥伴們將會如法炮製。
The premise of the Leave campaign was false: a host of decisions that affect the UK will always be taken outside it.
退歐運動的前提假設就是錯誤的：大量影響英國的決策總是會在英國以外作出。
But this truth is unlikely to stop the train towards a complete Brexit from departing on its timetabled journey.
但這一真相不大可能阻止通往完全退歐的列車出發，踏上已定好了時間表的旅程。
Stopping it would take a miracle, or rather a crisis.
要阻止這趟列車需要一個奇蹟，或者更確切地說需要一場危機。
Is that likely? No.
可能出現奇蹟嗎？不可能。
Is it possible? Yes.
徹底退歐可能嗎？是的。
