外匯交易員們近來熱議一項新的廣場協議

Foreign exchange traders are buzzing with talk of a new “Plaza Accord”, following the marked change in the behaviour of the major currencies after the Shanghai G20 meetings in late February.

外匯交易員們近來熱議一項新的“廣場協議”(Plaza Accord)，因爲在20國集團(G20) 2月下旬在上海開會之後，主要貨幣走勢出現了顯著變化。

Since then, the dollar has weakened, just as it did after the Plaza meetings on 22 September 1985. The Chinese renminbi has been falling against its basket, in direct contrast with the “stable basket” exchange rate policy that was publicly emphasisedby PBOC Governor Zhou just before Shanghai. The euro and, especially, the yen have strengthened, in defiance of monetary policy easing by the ECB and the Bank of Japan.

自G20會議以來，美元有所貶值，就像1985年9月22日的廣場會議之後那樣。人民幣相對其貨幣籃子不斷貶值，與中國央行(PBoC)行長周小川在上海會議前夕強調的“穩定籃子”匯率政策相悖。歐元、尤其是日元有所升值，不理會歐洲央行(ECB)和日本央行(BoJ)的寬鬆貨幣政策。

Following Shanghai, the markets have become loathe to push the dollar higher, believing that the G20 may now have come to a co-ordinated agreement, as they did at the Plaza, to reverse the direction of the US currency. Does this comparison make any economic sense?

上海會議以來，市場變得不願推高美元，認爲G20如今或許已達成了一份協調的協議（就像當年幾個大國在紐約廣場飯店(Plaza Hotel)所做的那樣），以扭轉美元匯率走勢。這種對比在經濟上有道理嗎？

The Shanghai communique did place increased emphasis on an agreement among the major economies to avoid “competitive devaluations”. The main suspects here were Japan, the Eurozone and (sometimes) China, all of whom have good reasons to push their currencies down. The fact that the communique eschewed this course of action is therefore a reason to believe that the dollar might be subjected to less upward pressure. But that does not make it a new Plaza.

上海會議的公告的確強調，主要經濟體達成了避免“競爭性貶值”的共識。在這方面，主要嫌疑人是日本和歐元區，有時還包括中國，這三個經濟體都有充足理由壓低本幣。公告反對這一做法的事實，成了相信美元上漲壓力或許會減弱的一條理由。但這並不使其成爲新的廣場協議。

The 1985 Plaza Accord was probably the most dramatic coordinated intervention in the foreign exchange markets since floating currencies began in 1971. The dollar had been rising markedly for several years, largely as a result of Ronald Reagan’s fiscal expansion, combined with Paul Volcker’s monetary squeeze. By 1985, the rise in the dollar was widely agreed to have exceeded economic fundamentals, and most G7 governments thought there were speculative elements involved.

1985年廣場協議很可能是自1971年浮動匯率制啓動以來，國際社會對外匯市場進行的最劇烈的一致干預。在那之前的幾年裏，美元大幅上漲，這主要是羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)的財政擴張，以及保羅•沃爾克(Paul Volcker)的貨幣收緊的結果。到1985年，市場普遍認爲，美元匯率水平已超前於經濟基本面；同時7國集團(G7)的多數政府認爲，這其中含有投機成分。

The strong dollar was at first warmly welcomed by the US Treasury, led by Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and Beryl Sprinkel, the Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs and the icon of free market currency policies at the time. But when the leadership of the Treasury passed to the much more pragmatic James Baker in February 1985, the US attitude began to change. The US manufacturing sector was being squeezed by the overvalued dollar, and Congress was seriously contemplating protectionist policies against Japan and Germany. Something had to be done.

剛開始，強勢美元得到了美國財政部的熱烈歡迎，尤其是時任財長唐納德•裏甘(Donald Regan)和負責貨幣事務的副國務卿、當時自由市場匯率政策的標杆人物貝里爾•斯普林克爾(Beryl Sprinkel)的。但在1985年2月財政部領導人換成了更加務實的詹姆斯•貝克(James Baker)之後，美國官方立場開始改變。當時美元高估衝擊了美國製造業，國會正在認真考慮出臺針對日本和德國的保護主義政策。里根政府必須有所作爲。

The dollar actually started to fall in April 1985, many months in advance of the Plaza meeting itself. Earlier G7 meetings had discussed foreign exchange interventions, and the Bundesbank was believed to have sold dollars repeatedly in the spring. But it was only when the Plaza statement appeared in September that the slide in the dollar turned into a rout.

1985年4月，美元實際上已開始貶值了，比廣場會議早了好幾個月。更早的G7會議討論過干預匯市，德國央行(Bundesbank)據信在那年春季多次拋售美元。但只是在9月廣場協議聲明發表後，美元走勢才從小跌變成大跌。

From start to finish, the international policy shift surrounding the Plaza meeting caused a 40 per cent decline in the dollar over a period of 3 years. It was the high water mark for co-ordinated global macro-economic policy, and for direct central bank intervention in the currency markets. (See this superb analysis of Plaza by Jeffrey Frankel at the Harvard Kennedy School.)

由始至終，圍繞廣場會議的國際政策變化，導致美元在3年內貶值了40%，整件事堪稱全球宏觀經濟政策協調和央行直接干預匯市的標杆。（參閱哈佛大學肯尼迪學院(Harvard Kennedy School)的傑弗裏•弗蘭克爾(Jeffrey Frankel)對廣場協議的出色分析文章。）

Could it happen again? At present, the formal agreements among G20 economies are predicated on two principles – no concerted intervention in the currency markets, and no deliberate attempts to engage in competitive devaluations. This does not seem to leave any room for a co-ordinated set of foreign exchange interventions to devalue the dollar.

廣場協議的歷史可能重演嗎？當前，G20經濟體達成的正式共識是基於兩條原則的——不對匯市進行協同干預，以及不刻意進行競爭性貶值。這似乎沒有爲協調幹預外匯市場、壓低美元留下任何空間。

Furthermore, there is no agreement among the major nations that the dollar needs to be devalued. It is not widely seen to be overvalued on fundamental grounds. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to 1985, when Germany and Japan were willing to accept rising exchange rates to head off US trade protection and dampen domestic inflation, there is no willingness anywhere in the G20 to accept a currency revaluation. Deflation pressures are too threatening for that, as Japan is now demonstrating.

此外，大國間並未達成美元需要貶值的共識。從基本面來看，美元被高估並非各方廣泛認同的觀點。再者，跟1985年形成鮮明對照的是，那時的德國和日本樂於接受匯率升值、以化解美國貿易保護威脅並抑制國內通脹，但如今的G20經濟體中，誰也不願接受匯率重估。那麼做的通縮壓力太可怕了，正如當前的日本所展示的那樣。

There is a good case for arguing that, if there were to be a new Plaza Accord, it should be applied to the Chinese renminbi, not to the US dollar. China has been the main loser from the currency wars of the present decade. Its real exchange rate has risen by 40 per cent since 2010, while the dollar has risen somewhat and the other major economies have all depreciated sharply. Although there is no agreement that this has left the renminbi greatly overvalued (since it started in 2010 from an undervalued level) this rise has exacerbated deflationary pressures in China and left the currency in an unstable condition.

人們有充分理由主張，如果真的有一份新的廣場協議，那它應當適用於人民幣、而不是美元。中國已成爲本十年匯率戰的主要輸家。自2010年以來，人民幣的實際匯率累計升值40%，而美元只是有所升值，其他主要經濟體的貨幣都大幅貶值了。儘管不是所有人都認爲這已導致人民幣嚴重高估（因爲人民幣是在2010年從低估水平開始升值的），但這種升值已惡化了中國國內的通縮壓力，並使人民幣陷於一種不穩定狀態。

The global economy might benefit from a controlled downward float in the renminbi. This would puncture the exaggerated fears of uncontrolled Chinese devaluation in the global markets. But any such agreement seems completely off the international political agenda. In the US, no politician in an election year could contemplate any such thing.

全球經濟或許會受益於人民幣的受控貶值。這將化解全球市場對於人民幣失控貶值的被誇大的擔心。但是，這種協議似乎不可能進入國際政治議程。在美國，沒有一個政客可以在選舉年考慮這種事情。

So where does that leave the supposed Plaza Accord of 2016? There is no such thing, at least in a formal and explicit sense. And nor will there be. There is no consensus among the leading nations, either that the dollar needs to be pushed lower, or that the renminbi is overvalued. In an era of global disinflation, no country is willing to allow others to devalue.

那麼，應該如何看待想象中的2016版廣場協議呢？根本沒有這樣的協議，起碼沒有正式、明確的版本。未來也不會有。在美元需要被壓低、或是人民幣目前被高估的問題上，主要國家之間不存在共識。在全球“通脹減速”時代，沒有一個國家願意允許其他國家貶值貨幣。

However, it is possible that there has been a different form of accommodation, in which both China and the US Federal Reserve have independently decided that they have needed to adjust their strategy in response to the financial turbulence in January. One interpretation is that China seriously contemplated a major devaluation around the turn of the year, after experiencing difficulties in coping with the capital outflows that followed the Fed’s rate hike on 15 December.

然而，可能出現某種不同的寬鬆——中國和美聯儲(Fed)分別決定，他們需要調整自己的策略，以迴應今年1月的金融動盪。一種解讀是，在應對去年12月15日美聯儲加息引發的資本外流時遇到種種困難後，中國在今年初前後曾認真考慮大幅貶值人民幣。

Having seen the international consequences of its initial rate rise, and the unintended tightening in US financial conditions that ensued, the Fed then decided that it could not persist with its intended pace of interest rate increases unless China stabilised its economy first. This was not so much an accord as an independent meeting of minds.

在看到首次加息後的國際後果和隨之而來的美國金融狀況意外收緊之後，美聯儲判斷，在中國經濟企穩之前，它不能維持原定的加息步伐。這與其說是一份協議，不如說是想到一塊去了。

The effects of this meeting of minds on exchange rates will last only until the Fed reverts to its earlier determination to “normalise” interest rates for domestic reasons. That is unlikely to happen at the FOMC meeting on Wednesday, but it probably cannot be postponed for much longer.

這一不謀而合對匯率的影響，將只會延續到美聯儲恢復早先的決心（爲了國內需要而實行利率“正常化”）。在4月的美聯儲聯邦公開市場委員會(FOMC)上，不太可能出現這一局面，但這很可能不會拖得太久。