中國在南中國海的兩手抓戰略
What do the governments of Belarus, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Russia have in common, apart from their lack of enthusiasm for participatory democracy?
白俄羅斯、文萊、柬埔寨、老撾和俄羅斯幾國的政府除了都對參與式民主沒興趣之外，還有什麼共同之處呢？
Beijing claims they have all recently come out in support of its position on the South China Sea. It says they back its arguments, either that maritime disputes should be resolved bilaterally or that the arbitration case brought by the Philippines against Beijing’s claims is illegitimate.
中國政府宣佈上述政府最近都站出來支持其在南中國海的立場，稱它們支持自己的觀點，包括海上糾紛應通過雙邊協商解決，以及菲律賓對中國的領土主張提出的仲裁案是不合法的。
This is no accident. A judgment on the Philippines case is expected within months. Beijing is working hard to persuade other countries that the court of arbitration in The Hague has no right to adjudicate on its claims.
此事絕非偶然。菲律賓提出的仲裁案預計將在數月內得出裁決。北京方面正努力說服其他國家相信，海牙仲裁法庭無權對中國的主張作出裁決。
During recent weeks, Wang Yi, the wily Chinese foreign minister, has been courting counterparts with renewed vigour, with visits to Brunei, Cambodia and Laos designed to keep Southeast Asia divided in its approach to China.
近幾周來，深謀遠慮的中國外長王毅一直以充沛的精力拜訪同行，訪問了文萊、柬埔寨和老撾，意圖分化東南亞對中國的態度。
Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, last week became the latest senior diplomat to side with China’s opposition to external interference — read the US — in the South China Sea.
俄羅斯外長謝爾蓋•拉夫羅夫(Sergei Lavrov)上週成爲支持中國立場的最新一位高級外交官，表示反對對南中國海問題的外部干預——意指美國。
China has drawn huge attention — and criticism — for its construction of islands and military facilities on contested reefs. But diplomacy is an equally important part of its strategy for dominating these waters, which contain rich fisheries, vast oil and gas reserves and key global trade routes.
中國的填海造島、以及在爭議性島礁上建造軍事設施的舉動，已引起極大關注與批評，但外交同樣是其主導這片海域的重要策略。該海域含有豐富的漁業資源、大量石油和天然氣儲量，以及關鍵的全球貿易路線。
The unfolding public relations battle over the Philippines arbitration case shows that policymakers in Beijing are worried China will look like a rogue international rule-breaker because of its defiance of The Hague tribunal.
圍繞菲律賓仲裁案展開的這場公關戰顯示出，北京的政策制定者擔心中國會因藐視海牙法庭而被看作野蠻的國際規則破壞者。
The Philippines contends that China’s claim to “historic rights” over almost the entire South China Sea — based on its “nine-dash line” map — has no basis in international law. Manila also claims large parts of these waters, as does Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam.
菲律賓稱中國基於其“九段線”地圖對幾乎整個南中國海提出的“歷史性權利”主張沒有任何國際法依據。菲律賓政府也對該海域大片區域提出主張，文萊、馬來西亞、臺灣和越南也一樣。
Although the judges are not considering overt questions of sovereignty, if they rule in the Philippines’ favour on this issue, it would significantly undermine China’s claims.
雖然法官不會考慮主權問題，但如果他們在這件事上的判決傾向菲律賓一方，將對中國的主張造成嚴重破壞。
The US and the EU, which are concerned about China’s increasingly strident behaviour, have thrown their weight behind Manila, arguing that Beijing should respect the outcome of the case.
美國和歐盟對於中國日益強硬的行爲十分關注，它們對菲律賓政府予以支持，認爲北京應該尊重裁決結果。
China is lining up its own team of supporters and is neutralising potential opponents with the promise of big infrastructure investments for those who play ball.
中國正在組織自己的支持者隊伍，並努力讓潛在的反對者中立化，對願意合作者許以大型基礎設施投資的承諾。
Beijing wants to ensure that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the only regional body that regularly discusses security issues, remains divided and weak when it comes to the South China Sea.
北京方面希望確保，唯一定期討論安全問題的地區組織——東盟(ASEAN)——在面對南中國海問題時仍然維持分裂、軟弱的狀態。
Regional diplomats fear that it is succeeding.
該地區外交官擔心，這一策略正在取得成功。
Mr Wang claimed after the visit to Brunei, Laos and Cambodia that Beijing had reached a “consensus” with these nations to oppose “unilateral” actions, a euphemism for the Philippines case.
在對文萊、老撾、柬埔寨進行訪問後，王毅宣稱，中國已經與這些國家就反對“單邊”行動（對菲律賓行爲的委婉說法）達成了“共識”。
Laos and Cambodia, which rely heavily on Chinese investment, have long done Beijing’s bidding by preventing Asean from taking a harder line on the maritime disputes. But oil-rich Brunei, which is feeling the pressure of lower crude prices, has not previously sided so openly with China.
由於嚴重依賴中國投資，老撾與柬埔寨長期以來一直按照北京方面的吩咐，阻撓東盟在海洋領土爭端上採取更強硬的路線。但石油資源豐富的文萊——如今正承受原油價格下跌帶來的壓力——此前從未如此公開地站在中國一邊。
Meanwhile, Southeast Asia’s biggest nation, Indonesia, is trying hard to stay out of the disputes, insisting that a recent clash with China’s coastguard over illegal fishing has nothing to do with China’s geostrategic ambitions.
與此同時，東南亞最大國家印度尼西亞正努力置身這些爭端之外。該國堅稱，最近圍繞非法捕魚與中國海警發生的一起衝突與中國的地緣政治野心無關。
This is music to Beijing’s ears.
這種表態令北京方面感到悅耳。
Donald Weatherbee, a visiting fellow at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, says that “Indonesia and the other four targets of China’s South China Sea policy are in the same boat, but there is no captain or sailing directions”.
新加坡東南亞研究所(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies)訪問研究員唐納德•韋瑟比(Donald Weatherbee)表示：“印尼與中國南中國海政策其他四個目標國家同坐一條船，但他們沒有船長或航行指南。”
Divisions among China’s Southeast Asian neighbours have left the way open for it to alter the “facts on the water” by building military installations from runways to radar stations in the South China Sea.
東南亞鄰國間的分歧使中國得以一路暢通地通過在南中國海建立軍事設施——從飛機跑道到雷達站——來改變“海上現狀”。
Ashley Townshend, a research fellow at the University of Sydney, compares Beijing’s actions to those of a rebel group trying to amass as much bargaining power as possible before being forced eventually to agree a ceasefire.
悉尼大學(University of Sydne)研究員阿什利•湯曾德(Ashley Townshend)將北京方面的行爲，比作反叛組織的成員試圖在最終被迫同意停火前儘可能多地積累討價還價的籌碼。
The next test of Beijing’s appetite for risk could come at the Scarborough Shoal, which it snatched from Philippines control in 2012. It is rumoured to be the next destination for China’s island-building barges.
對北京方面風險偏好的下一場考驗可能來自斯卡伯勒淺灘（Scarborough Shoal，中國稱黃巖島）。中國於2012年從菲律賓奪得了對該島的控制權。據稱，這裏將是中國大批造島駁船的下一個目的地。
If China does try to build up a reef that lies not far from Manila, the US would come under pressure to respond with more freedom of navigation operations or some other show of military force.
如果中國真的試圖在這處距馬尼拉不遠的島礁填海造島，美國將面臨以更多的航行自由行動或其他展示軍事力量的方式進行迴應的壓力。
But Beijing is hoping it can continue to get away with incrementally changing the status quo and neutralising opposition.
但北京方面正希望能夠繼續如願地一邊逐步改變現狀，一邊讓反對的國家中立化。
