投資風險資本 前景撲朔迷離

“Is now the time to double down, or to slam on the brakes?”

“現在應該加大投資，還是急踩剎車？”

That was the question posed to me earlier this week by a portfolio manager who has investments in dozens of venture capital funds, including some of the industry’s most illustrious names. I’m not (quite) so egotistical as to think he would make multi-million decisions on my two cents, but the inquiry was sincere. This is an extraordinarily tricky time to be investing in venture capital, perhaps more so than at any other time in the past two decades.

本週早些時候，一位投資組合經理向我提出了這個問題。他投資了數十家風險投資基金，包括業內最優秀的投資基金。我沒有自負到以爲他會因爲我的一點小小建議便做出涉及數百萬美元的投資決定，但他確實非常真誠。如今，投資風險資本，正處在過去二十年間最難以捉摸的時期，

To be clear, I’m not saying that investment returns are underwater. Quite the opposite. Venture capital fund valuations have been climbing for years, and distributions appear to be at record highs thanks to vibrant IPO and M&A markets. For example, Harvard University’s endowment reported yesterday that its VC return for fiscal 2014 was 32.8% — compared to a 15.4% return for its total portfolio and the S&P 500’s 21.38% gain over the same time period.

需要明確的是，我並不是說投資收益正在縮水。事實恰恰相反。近幾年，風險投資基金的估值在持續攀升，而生氣勃勃的IPO（首次公開募股）和併購市場，推動風投基金派發的股息達到歷史新高。例如，哈佛大學（Harvard University）的捐助基金昨天宣佈，其2014財年的風險投資回報率爲32.8%——而其投資組合的總體回報率爲15.4%，標準普爾500指數（S&P 500）的同期回報率爲21.38%。

But that’s the very problem: Limited partners are not investing a spot prices. They are committing to long-term funds that will (hopefully) begin generating returns several years out. And they worry that if we aren’t at a market top today, we’ll be there when it comes time to begin harvesting — leaving their VC managers with overpriced portfolios that have relatively few exit opportunities.

但問題在於：有限責任合夥人並未投資現貨價格。他們選擇的投資對象，是（有望）能夠在幾年之後開始產生回報的長期基金。他們擔心，即便市場現在尚未觸頂，也必將在基金帶來收益的時候到達頂峯——結果是，風險投資基金經理的投資組合定價過高，卻只有相對較少的退出機會。

Most limited partners were around for the last tech cycle, and promised to never again get sucked down the same rabbit hole. Now they see a proliferation of VC firms not only raising $1 billion funds, but also a shortening of the fundraising cycle (most notably Tiger Global seeking $1.5 billion just 5 months after closing its last $1.5 billion pool). So there are all sorts of historical data points to support pulling back right now. But what if this is really 1997 or the first half of 1998, instead of 1999? What if you bail to soon, and leave millions of dollars on the table? And what if this time really “is different,” due to both better fundamental business models, a larger pool of prospective buyers and a milder economic recovery? But, wait, isn’t even considering that “this time is different” a definitive sign to hit the road?

大多數有限責任合夥人都經歷了上一個科技週期，並且信誓旦旦地表示，再也不會陷入同樣的困境。如今他們看到風險投資公司激增，不僅籌集的資金動輒超過10億美元，融資週期也大幅縮短【最明顯的是老虎環球基金（Tiger Global），這隻基金上一次募集了15億美元之後僅僅5個月，又再次募集了15億美元】。因此，有許多歷史數據支持現在退出這一領域。但如果我們現在的情形類似於1997年或者1998年上半年，而不是1999年，情況又會如何？如果你太早離開，結果導致數以百萬計的資金無所作爲，怎麼辦？如果更好的基本商業模式、更多的潛在買家和更溫和的經濟復甦，意味着現在確實是一個“不同的”時代，我們又該怎麼辦？但是，等等，想到“現在是一個不同的時代”難道不是應該立刻退出的明確信號嗎？

So I gave the portfolio manager my most honest response: I have no idea what he should do, except perhaps to avoid anyone who answers the question with any degree of certainty.

所以，我給了那位投資組合經理最誠實的回答：我不知道他應該做什麼，但如果有人言之鑿鑿地回答這個問題，絕對不能輕信。