島國閒事:安倍劫老濟少

One objection to “Abenomics”, the reflationary creed adopted by Japan’s new government, is that it will erode hard-earned savings. Instead of simply grabbing them over the weekend – as has become fashionable in certain parts of Europe – the government hopes to siphon them off gradually through gentle inflation.

對“安倍經濟學”（Abenomics，日本新政府採取的通貨再膨脹信條）的一種反駁觀點就是，它將侵蝕人們勤苦攢下的儲蓄。與歐洲一些地方已經比較流行的在一夜之間攫取人們儲蓄的做法不同，日本政府希望逐漸通過緩和的通脹來“吸走”人們的儲蓄。

This is a dastardly plan. It is unlikely to prove popular with the over-60s, who make up a quarter of Japan’s population, but who control two-thirds of its vast household assets. It is a good idea all the same.

這是一個殘忍的計劃，它不太可能會受到60歲以上的人的歡迎，這些人佔日本人口的四分之一，卻掌控着日本家庭資產的三分之二。但這依然是個好主意。

The reason for welcoming this intergenerational theft is that, for 20 years, Japan has prioritised the interests of older generations over younger ones. That is not only unfair. Penalising youth is also not the best way to build a nation’s future. Taxing the old through inflation is one way to redress what has been a long squeeze of one generation by another.

贊成這種代際“盜竊”的理由是，20年來，日本一直注重的是年長一代的利益，而不是年輕一代。這不僅不公平，而且損害年輕人的利益也不是塑造一個國家未來的最好方式。通過通脹向年老一代徵稅，是糾正長期以來一代人“壓榨”另一代人的一種方式。

Most of the squeezing has taken place in the workplace. The pre-bubble generation, those who got jobs before the 1990 asset-price crash, had a fairly straightforward path to prosperity. After negotiating “exam hell”, they proceeded to good universities and from there to big companies that would recruit them straight after graduation. In return for life-long loyalty, employees would be given a job until retirement with ascending seniority and pay.

大部分的“壓榨”都發生在工作場所。泡沫之前的一代人，也就是那些在上世紀90年代資產價格崩潰之前獲得工作的人，有一條通往富裕的直接道路。在經歷了“考試地獄”之後，他們進入好的大學，畢業之後直接獲得大企業的聘用。作爲終生忠誠的回報，員工在退休之前都有工作保障，並且職位和薪資也在不斷上升。

This happy system was not for everyone. Even in the fast-growth decades, the lifetime employment model only covered about 30-40 per cent of employees. But its creed spread further than that. In 1990, just one in five employees was classified as non-permanent.

但並不是每個人都能享受這種幸福體系。即使是在快速增長的那幾十年，終生就業模式也只是覆蓋到30%到40%的員工。但持有這樣信條的人卻遠遠超過這一比例。1990年，只有五分之一的就業者被認爲是非永久性的。

That all changed when the bubble burst. As companies paid back debts and slowly reined in expenses to match reduced revenue prospects, they cut costs. Naturally, there were some lay-offs. But in Japan, far fewer workers lost their jobs than in societies with more flexible labour laws and less sense of loyalty to existing employees.

泡沫破滅的時候，所有的一切都發生了變化。公司既要償還債務，又要因爲未來收入下降的前景緩慢控制開銷，因此它們會削減成本。很自然就會出現一些裁員。但相比有着更靈活勞動法和對現有員工忠誠感較低的社會，日本失業的工人較少。

Thus those who bore the brunt of restructuring were Japan’s youth, who were simply not hired by big companies but shunted into casual work. As a result, about 35 per cent of workers are now casual or part time. Such jobs are held overwhelmingly by younger workers and women. Youth unemployment is more than twice the national average at about 10 per cent.

因此受到重組影響的首當其衝的就是日本的年輕人，他們沒有被大公司僱傭，而是從事臨時工作。因此，目前大約有35%的人是臨時工人或者從事兼職。從事這種工作的人絕大多數都是年輕人和女性。因而年輕人的失業率大約爲10%，是全國平均水平的兩倍以上。

Dimmer employment prospects for young people have not been the only problem. Younger workers have been expected to contribute more than today’s retirees to the state pension. To add insult to injury this will pay out less. Many younger people have opted out altogether. Having taken a look at Japan’s finances – chronic fiscal deficits and gross public debt at 230 per cent of output – they have concluded there may be no payout at all when they retire.

年輕人面臨的問題不僅是黯淡的就業前景。一直以來年輕的就業人員對國家養老金的貢獻都要多於現在的退休人員。更糟糕的是，未來他們得到的會更少。於是很多年輕人乾脆選擇退出。看看日本的財政狀況——長期財政赤字，公共債務總額高達國內生產總值(GDP)的230%——他們認爲等到他們退休的時候，或許根本就拿不到養老金。

Deflation has been the main culprit in Japan’s 20-year economic drama. But, ironically, it has also been the saviour. Part-time workers may get miserable wages, but that is not so bad when prices are back at 1990 levels. Interest rates on savings are derisory but they provide a positive return when measured against falling prices. The government too may have a huge debt but it is easily serviced when 10-year Japanese government bonds yield less than 1 per cent.

日本20年的經濟低迷中，通貨緊縮一直都是罪魁禍首。具有諷刺意味的是，它也是一個救星。兼職工作者的工資或許很低，但如果物價回到上世紀90年代的水平，也還是能夠過得去的。儘管儲蓄利率低得讓人嗤之以鼻，但考慮到物價下降，儲蓄的回報還是正的。日本政府或許揹負着沉重的債務，但當10年期國債收益率低於1%的時候，履債還是比較輕鬆的。

Japan’s households own about $12tn of net assets, a little less than the government’s gross debt, and considerably more than its net debt. Since more than 90 per cent of public debt is owned by Japanese, the problem is more about distribution of pain than risk of default. One way of looking at Japan’s debt is as deferred tax. Instead of paying tax, Japanese savers have lent money to the government so that it can spend more than it can raise in (deflationary suppressed) revenue.

日本家庭大約擁有12萬億美元的淨資產，略低於政府總債務，但卻遠遠高於其淨債務。由於90%以上的公共債務都是由日本人民持有，因此問題與其說在於債務違約的風險，還不如說在於債務之痛的分配。可以將日本債務看作遞延稅。日本儲蓄者不是以納稅的方式，而是以借錢給政府的方式，使得政府的支出能夠高於（被通縮抑制的）收入。

Now the government could tax workers directly through higher income tax or indirectly through higher corporate tax. But that seems unfair since younger people have already paid a price through reduced opportunity and earnings potential.

現在政府可以通過更高的所得稅直接向工人徵稅，或者是通過更高的企業稅間接徵稅。但這看起來是不公平的，因爲年輕人已經因爲就業機會和潛在收入的減少而付出了代價。

Alternatively, the government could tax those who accumulated wealth in the good years. Inflation is one way of doing that. So is inheritance tax. And indeed, the government plans to raise estate tax from 50 per cent to 55 per cent.

或者，政府也可以向那些在繁榮時期積累了財富的人徵稅。通貨膨脹就是一種方式，遺產稅也是。實際上，政府正在計劃將房地產遺產稅從50%提高到55%。

The intergenerational conflict is not as stark as the above analysis makes it sound. In practice, younger people with less well-paid jobs often live with their parents. There is even a term for it – parasite singles. Grandparents indulge their grandchildren by running down their savings to pay for luxuries or education, a pattern now being encouraged with tax exemptions on some intergenerational transfers.

代際衝突並沒有上述分析讓人感覺的那麼激烈。實際上，收入不高的年輕人通常與父母生活在一起。甚至還有一個專門的詞來描述他們：“單身寄生族”(parasite singles)。祖父母會傾其儲蓄爲孫輩購買奢侈品或者是支付教育費用，現在的一些代際轉移支付免稅措施就鼓勵這種模式。

Generational rebalancing can go too far. Taro Aso, the 72-year-old finance minister, recently joked that old people should “hurry up and die” so that they did not drain the public purse. Such horrible insensitivity aside, robbing retirees to pay for the next generation is no panacea.

代際再平衡可能會走極端。72歲的日本財務大臣麻生太郎(Taro Aso)最近開玩笑說，老年人應該“趕緊去世”，這樣他們就不會擠佔公共資金。且不說其冷漠無情，搶劫退休人員爲下一代省錢也並不是萬靈藥。

More must be done, too, to shift money from cash-hoarding companies to cash-hungry households. Productivity must also be raised. Indeed, Prime minister Shinzo Abe’s plans could come unstuck if wages – stagnant or falling for years – fail to keep pace with hoped-for inflation.

必須採取更多行動，將錢從囤積資金的公司轉移到缺乏資金的家庭。同時還必須提高生產力。實際上，如果數年來一直停滯不前甚至是在下降的工資沒能跟得上預期通脹，那麼安倍首相的計劃可能就會失效。

Still, part of the point of moving from deflation to inflation is to help tomorrow’s earners and wealth creators. If Japan’s savers have to lose a little in the process, so be it.

而且，從通貨緊縮轉向通貨膨脹的部分意義在於，幫助未來的工薪階層和財富創造者。如果在這個過程中，日本的儲蓄者必須有一點損失，那也只能如此。